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The petroleum sector is one of the most interest based political sectors in both 
domestic and international affairs. This analysis focuses on the government’s ability to 
use the national oil companies to assert influence over the sector, and to ensure 
national interests.  
 The state anno 2007 is perceived as being a lot smaller, and a lot less powerful 
than its predecessors, it is the aim of this thesis to investigate this claim by looking at 
the potential for government control through National Oil Companies.  
 This is a case study of the Norwegian government’s ability to use StatoilHydro 
as a policy instrument in the Norwegian petroleum sector. In analyzing the research 
question: To what extent can the Norwegian government utilize the StatoilHydro as a 
policy instrument, and under which conditions could this happen? We find that the 
Norwegian government’s ability to effectively use this mechanism is in fact 
constrained by participating in rigid international regimes – thus subjecting itself to the 
effects of increased economic interdependence. However, we find that using a 
representative agent-principal model for exerting influence and control, the 
government can use the NOC as a policy instrument – albeit in attaining long-term 
national economic and political interests. This can happen if the government 
participates actively in the selection of board members, and in that way ensures that 
the basic understanding of the current political goals are present in the board. The 
current international climate – emphasizing energy security and security of supply, as 
well as the trend toward increased national control in some of the competitors of the 
Norwegian oil and gas industry may also prove to be a crucial circumstance.  
 From the case of Norway, whose membership in the EEA agreement makes the 
country especially vulnerable to the constraining effects of economic globalization, we 
can stipulate that the theories of Linda Weiss is a good explanatory tool for 
understanding the state anno 2007 – in that while the state is weaker, it is not as 
powerless as it is presented as in the globalization discourse.   
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Where the frontier between the state and the market is to be drawn has never been a 
matter that could be settled, once and for all, at some grand peace conference. 
Instead, it has been the subject, over the course of this century, of massive intellectual 
and political battles as well as constant skirmishes. In its entirety, the struggle 
constitutes one of the great dramas of the twentieth century. Today the clash is so far-
reaching and so encompassing that it is remaking our world – and preparing the 
canvas of the twenty-first century.  





Reading globalisation literature, one might be prone to ask where the states have gone. 
It is a common belief, that the global market forces have grown very powerful indeed. 
It would seem that the private industry now runs the table in international economics. 
If one sees the distribution of power in international and domestic politics as a zero-
sum game, then the natural response is to assume that this has left the state virtually 
powerless over its territories and the policy areas traditionally associated with the 
state. Using the theoretical framework presented by political economist Linda Weiss, 
the purpose of this text is to analyse what actually happens within the state – in other 
words, what has happened with the policy instruments previously available to the 
governments of states.  
The analysis presented here focuses the attention on one specific policy 
instrument, the state ownership of industrial companies. If the domestic politics is 
indeed so ribbed of power as the globalisation proponents would have it, then the 
national ownership should be a good place to look in order to put enquire as to what 
sort of state we can see today. As energy politics remain a sector that encompasses 
several national interests, such as security, security of supply and the financial spine of 
the industry, to focus our attention on this sector is prudent. This is a case study of the 
relationship between a state and its National Oil Company (NOC). The case is the 
relationship between the Norwegian government and its NOC, StatoilHydro. The 
research question is: To what extent can the Norwegian government utilize the 
StatoilHydro as a policy instrument, and under which conditions could this happen? 
The case is chosen to illuminate a broader, more general research question, that is: To 
what extent can the state utilize the NOC as a policy instrument and under which 
conditions could this happen. The question is based on an assumption that regardless 
of the “rules of the game”, the NOC still lies somewhere between the state level and 
the market level. 
In Norway the companies Statoil and Hydro recently merged into the company 
StatoilHydro. This has created a substantial level of debate in Norway regarding the 
government’s ownership policies. The discussion is also increased by the current 
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government’s whitepaper on ownership – that sets out a more hands on approach than 
the approach taken by many previous governments.   
   
1.2. A broad framework for analysis 
The idea that states, and state agencies, have lost much of their former power can be 
read as a near consensus in the field of political economy. Where have this power 
ended up, and how much is left? is a relevant question . 
 One of the most significant changes in the world economy is the globalisation 
of production. What before had to be produced nearby the marketplace, can now be 
produced almost anywhere. As an example we can look at the Norwegian market for 
fish produce. According to the newspaper Aftenposten (June 3rd) the number one 
source of white fish imports in Norway is China, which catches the net sum of zero 
kilos worth of Atlantic cod a year. Much of the fish products we import from China 
are, in fact, from the Norwegian seas.  
 In many parts of the world, the big corporations now control many of the things 
previously controlled by the governments of states. The distribution of wealth, the 
decision of who gets what, and when, is now a question largely left to the market and 
the corporations. There lies a paradox in all this. As Susan Strange puts it: “It was not 
that the TNCs stole or purloined power from the governments of states. It was handed 
to them on a plate – and, moreover, for “reasons of state”” (Strange 1996: 44).   
 Norway is a small state on the outskirts of Europe, with a partial membership in 
the European Union through the EEA agreement. As an international regime, the EEA 
agreement is rigid, and the rules and regulations that stem from this agreement are 
founded on actively seeking a free market within the European Economic Area. This 
means that Norway is a good case for analysing the impact of globalisation, since the 




1.3. Design and structure of the analysis  
In effect, this is a study of the impacts globalisation and market orientation has on the 
choices currently available to nation states. Linda Weiss´ description of the 
globalisation debate stands as a good starting point for this discussion.   
 
[The discussion about globalisations impact on domestic institutions] evokes that 
well told tale about a drunken fellow who loses his keys a dark place and then goes 
over by the light to search for them. “What are you doing?” asks a passing stranger. 
“Well”, replies the inebriate, “I won’t get very far searching for my keys in a dark 
place, so I’m looking over here where the light is brighter (Weiss 2003:2)”  
 
In many ways, domestic institutions resemble this dark place. It often seems easier to 
search for the impact of globalisation where the light is better. The big picture is 
illuminated; the constraints coming from institutions like WTO and EU are well 
documented. The response of the states, and the various ways that states cope with the 
possibilities and constraints imposed by interdependence and economic globalisation 
seems harder to analyse (Ibid).  
This is no normative study, and it is not a study of the options of the current 
Norwegian government per se. In this analysis, we do not look at the prudence of 
using the NOC as a policy instrument, and we do not weigh the interests – meaning 
that while for instance global warming is a grave threat, this analysis will exist 
regardless of what the government chooses to do with its ownership power in the 
national oil company. Another thing this analysis is not is a comparison between the 
ownership as a policy instrument and other policy instruments available. The 
government has many different policy instruments to use in different situations. This is 
an analysis of what will happen if the government chooses one specific instrument: the 
ownership in the oil company StatoilHydro. 
 The relationship in focus here is that between the government and its national 
oil company. In order to fully understand it, we need to take into consideration the 
influence that stem from domestic preferences, domestic institutions, global political 
preferences and the impact of international regimes the state is a member of.  
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1.3.1. The case study approach 
 King, Keohane and Verba describe the process of scientific inference as the “process 
of using the facts we know, to learn about the facts we do not know” (1994: 46). The 
scientific design chosen for this analysis is the case study. To investigate the state of 
the national state, we look at the Norwegian petroleum sector. This analysis is theory 
testing, in that we compare the empirical findings in this one case, with the broader 
theoretical conceptions from more macro oriented theories of international political 
economy. The theoretical unit of analysis here is the states ability to use the NOC as a 
policy instrument. Choosing the Norwegian sector as the case makes the unit analysis 
the Norwegian government’s ability to use StatoilHydro as a policy instrument.  
 Yin (2003) writes about the case study as a scientific approach that enables 
extensive empirical knowledge in a small segment of reality, and using that knowledge 
to gain a broader understanding when comparing the findings to the theoretical 
framework. Compared to other mechanisms for attaining scientific inference and to 
generalise finds, such as statistics, the case study approach relies more on the 
analytics. Generalizing from a case study is done through the application of theory, 
and thoroughly analysing the data. It is also through the use of theory that we gain 
external validity (Yin 2003: 28ff).   
Based on theory, we arrive at three expectations for the empirical data in this 
analysis.  
(i) The states role vis-à-vis the market and the NOC have changed as a 
consequence of both changes in domestic preferences and international pressure.  This 
has led to institutional reform and changes in the mainstream political attitude towards 
using the NOC to attain national interests in the sector.  
(ii) The states ability to control the NOC is constrained as a consequence of 
domestic institutional reform, and participation in rigid international regimes.  
And, (iii) the state may also be given an extended room to control the NOC as a 
consequence of interdependence, through the global political currents.  
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1.4. Structure of the text 
The first chapter of the text consists of the theoretical framework for analysis. In the 
following chapters (3 and 4), the focus is shifted to the case, and the institutional 
change in Norwegian petroleum politics, and the classification of national interests 
that can be sought through ownership. In chapter five, we look at the political context 
in Norway. The political context shapes the goals of the politicians. The historic role 
of the Norwegian government in the industry is also presented in chapter five. The 
legal context that needs to be taken into consideration is presented in chapter six. 
Rules and regulations that surround the petroleum sector, and in general regulate the 
maneuvering room available to the government are paramount in understanding how 
the NOC can be used. Chapter seven contains the general discussion of theory and the 
empirical findings.  
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2.0. State – market relations: Theoretical perspectives 
The different parts of the research question are dependent on each other. We can, in 
other words, not answer the first part of the question without a sufficient 
understanding of both the various ways to use a NOC, and the context under which 
this use is carried out. The luxury of theoretical abstraction is, however, that we are 
able to separate the parts of the question in order to understand the underlying 
conceptions first, and then bring them all together again when we bring the empirical 
data in.  
 The thought that international relations can have a great influence on domestic 
affairs is not a new one. Because of increased interdependence and other forms of 
cross border entanglement what happens on the international level cannot be separated 
from the domestic scene in the way it’s sometimes done in traditional IP-theory. 
Kenneth Waltz argued that domestic politics influenced the structural reality of 
international relations, and that the internal dispositions of states had an effect on the 
prospect of war and peace in international relations (Waltz 2001:81) In the 1978 essay 
“The second image reversed”, Peter Gourevitch asks whether the “traditional 
distinction between international relations and domestic politics is dead” (Gourevitch 
1978: 881). Gourevitch wrote his “Second image reversed” in reply to the Kenneth 
Waltz’ understanding of domestic policy. While I think the distinction is still relevant 
today, there are a lot of empirical and theoretical contributions that all suggest that the 
distinction is at least a different one today than it once was. The term interdependence 
and its relevance for international politics are elaborately discussed from different 
theoretical perspectives in Keohane (1986). The problem with the term globalisation is 
that it can mean just about anything from war to hamburgers, and hence the use of the 
term needs to be precise at some level. For the purposes of this text we could perhaps 
have used interdependence as at term. However, the ramifications of economic 
globalisation are larger than just interdependence. National economies are greatly 
dependent on one another, but the international perspective for policy development 
also need to be considered, and this is best described by globalisation – since it could 
theoretically exist without economic dependency. 
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 International relations theory sometimes handles domestic structures as a cause 
of international politics, meaning that international politics is a consequence of the 
various structures. The view of Gourevitch and the point of departure of this analysis 
is that the domestic structures are in turn a consequence of international relations 
(Gourevitch 1979: 882).  
2.1. The second image reversed, and re-focused  
Inn all its simplicity, Gourevitch’ argument is that “political development is shaped by 
war and trade” (Ibid: 883). The focus is laid on the institutional structures in domestic 
society, and on historic concepts such as regime type. More interestingly for us, the 
coalition structures in domestic society – including the type and mix of dominate elites 
(ibid). We shall keep the basic understanding of this IP theory, namely the conception 
that domestic structures can be seen as a consequence of international relations. The 
theoretical framework can however be strengthened by introducing concepts from the 
current globalisation discourse.  
 A common conception in the globalisation discourse is that the state has lost 
much of its former power – a lot of this power has been transferred to the market, and 
market actors other than the state. This is the staring point for our analysis as well. The 
goal of this text is to analyse the impact of globalisation on the states ability to use a 
NOC as a tool in a political context. In order to make sense of the international and the 
domestic, we need to further examine our theoretical base. In this chapter I will outline 
the theoretical backdrop of this paper, and seek to connect the theoretical perspectives 
of international political economy with those of domestic political management.  
 In international political economy, there is a near consensus that the state today 
is smaller than its predecessors. However, there are nuances. In this discussion I will 
focus on two main voices that differ in some relevant respects. Firstly, Susan Strange 
was one of the most known proponents of the school of the diminished state. She 
represented one of the most outspoken theories of the states loss of power (Strange 
1996). Secondly, Linda Weiss represents a somewhat different view – that the states 
still have a crucial influence over many areas. The role of the states is still very 
important, both on the domestic and on the international scene (Weiss 2001; Weiss 
2003).  
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 In the second part of this chapter we will se how the international political 
economy theories and the basic understanding of IP theory can converge with some 
theories of domestic public management. To do this we turn to theoreticians and 
scholars investigating policy change – and the relation between external circumstances 
and policy change. The domestic theories can enable us to tie the case and the basic 
theoretical universe together, and to find parameter to measure the states power vis-à-
vis the NOC. Combining these understandings will give us a theoretical image of the 
pathway of globalisation influence on domestic structures, such as the states ability to 
utilize the NOC. As we shall se later in this chapter, the different conceptions of the 
states current role give different expectations for the empirical data. Where Strange for 
instance would expect to find a state whose power vis-à-vis the market is limited, if 
not non-existent, Weiss may expect to find a state that has merely adapted to the 
external circumstances. The state expected by the proponents of the view taken by 
Weiss would seem different, but not necessarily weaker than its predecessors. The 
doors that are shut as a consequence of economic globalisation may well have opened 
others, and regarding the use of NOCs that may very well prove to be the case.  
 
2.2. Globalisation and state power – relevant IPE perspectives 
There are different views as to when the loss of state power became apparent. Many 
observers claim that the financial crisis of September 1992 represents the final triumph 
of transnational market actors over the state.  
 In his book “Global Political Economy” Robert Gilpin writes this about the 
financial crisis in the early 1990ies: 
 
In September 1992, an important and disturbing event occurred when, 
without warning, private investors suddenly transferred huge sums of 
money out of the British pound, the Italian lira, and other currencies into the 
German mark, thereby forcing an unwanted devaluation of the pound and 
other currencies. This devaluation significantly changed reshaped the 
economic and political landscape of Western Europe and tore apart the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System 
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(EMS), whose purpose was to maintain the values of the European 
Community currencies within specified narrow bands. As a consequence of 
this financial crisis, Great Britain withdrew from the ERM and caused the 
movement toward European economic and monetary integration to divide 
into a “two-speed” process of European unification (Gilpin 2001: 35)  
 
As noted, many observers see this incident as the definitive failure of domestic 
institutional economic control. Richard O’Brien (1992) even stated that this was “the 
end of geography”. In his book from 1992: “Global Financial Integration: the end of 
geography” he states that nations, and other regulators, no longer have the power to 
control the economy in their territories. He based much of his analysis on the 
experiences from Europe in the early nineties. O’Brian also emphasises the financial 
crisis that culminated in September 1992. While concluding that the end of geography 
is near, he also argues for the furthering of the EMU (European Monetary Union) 
(O’Brian 1992: 2ff).  
 
The end of geography is all about reduction of barriers: the EC process is 
all about reducing internal barriers within the single market, and hopefully 
not just replacing them with barriers around the EC itself (Ibid: 70). 
 
O’Brian represents a hard-line approach to the diminishing state, arguing for increased 
devaluation of power to market structures and trans/over-national institutions. As it 
were, Norway entered the EEA agreement just after O’Brian published his book – this 
is therefore a topic we shall return to when discussing our case. 
 Gilpin (2001) presents a different interpretation of the financial crisis in 1992 – 
emphasizing the specific roles of national governments in this process 
 Many scholars argue that the developments in the recent couple of decades 
have stripped the state as we know it. The basic argument is that the state has lost a 
significant part of its former powers, to the market, as well as to other non-state actors. 
One of the most vocal supporters of this argument was Susan Strange. In her 1996-
book Retreat of the State she writes that:  
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 The basic argument put forward is that the impersonal forces of world 
markets, integrated over the post-war period more by private enterprise in 
finance, industry and trade than by the cooperative decisions of 
governments, are now more powerful than the states to which the ultimate 
political authority over society and economy is supposed to belong (Strange 
1996: 4). 
 
The theoreticians who subscribe to this argument, like O’Brian, and especially Susan 
Strange advocate a view that the very scope of politics has diminished. According to 
this line of thought, there are two ways of looking at the state in post Cold-War 
international relations. Firstly, they say, there are those who stipulate that the state still 
is the central actor in international politics, and that no change has taken place. 
Secondly, there are those who accept that a change has occurred and that this means 
that the role of the state now seems to be a different one (Strange 1996: 66). 
 The financial crisis did in fact illustrate a power shift in international economic 
and political relations. The power of single states seemed to falter in the face of the 
powerful financial institutions, in this case the German Central Bank who raised the 
German interest rates substantially to offset the impact of the German reunification 
(Gilpin 2001: 37). It illustrated another thing as well, namely the differences in power 
between a few powerful states and the rest of the world states. While the few and 
powerful can influence the very dynamics of the world economy, the small economies 
just have to cope with the same dynamics (Ibid). 
 There is no doubt that globalization and economic interdependence has had an 
enormous effect on the state government’s room to manoeuvre. The relevant question 
is then how this has happened, and what is left of this room? The answer to this lie in 
the responses of the states to the globalization altered context for political movement. 
In this next section we shall direct our attention towards the movement and responses 
of the states.  
 The Strange–O’Brian way of looking at the state yield some theoretical 
expectations to how the state will appear in our case study. The theories and 
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descriptions presented by Strange and O’Brian present us with a rather passive state. 
International forces have stripped the state of its former power to regulate industry and 
economy. This would certainly also give us reason to believe that the state-marked 
relation has influences on the nature of the relationship between the State and the 
NOC. However, the thought that the state has been a passive player in the change, and 
the scope of the change is not a scientific consensus.  
2.2.1. Bringing the domestic institutions back in 
The thought that globalization has rendered the state virtually powerless has been 
given significant attention by contemporary observers. This idea is somewhat 
contested by Linda Weiss.  
  
However much globalisation throws constraints in the way of state 
activities, most notably in the macroeconomic arena, it also allows states 
sufficient room to move, and to act consonant with the social and economic 
operating objectives (Weiss 2003: 298). 
 
The traditional globalist argument, like the one we find in Susan Strange and O’Brian 
argue the notion that states gradually become similar – in that the influence of 
globalization creates such constraints on states. The fault, according to Weiss lie in 
that many observers seem to view the influence on state power, and distribution of 
power internationally is a zero-sum game (Weiss 1999: 61). The traditional 
globalization discourse focus greatly on the influence of globalization itself, and do not 
so much focus on the responses of states to these influences. This naturally leads to the 
hypothesis that the nature of states is converging. In other words, that since the states 
face the same environmental pressure, they end up being more similar. This, however, 
need not be completely true. By shifting the focus to the actual responses of states, we 
find that the pre-existing institutions and domestic political realities makes the states 
react to environmental pressure in different ways, giving a diverging rather than a 
converging trend (Weiss 1998: 11). The states ability to utilize a NOC as a policy 
instrument relies upon the international and global regimes the state is a part of; it 
relies a great deal on the institutional framework and the preferences in the domestic 
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political arena. It also relies on the room to move, generated by other international 
political currents.  
 The traditional globalization argument states that globalization creates policy 
constraints in the domestic political reality. This further intensifies economic 
interdependence – this in turn intensifies globalization. The causes of these constraints 
are however far to complex to be summed up by just outer pressure. The causes of 
domestic policy constraints are just as often a consequence of domestic politics (Weiss 
1999: 66). And further, the impact of economic interdependence greatly depends upon 
the pre-existing institutions and norms in the specific country (Weiss 2003: 301). 
  
Both the normative and organisational configuration of institutions play a 
key role in conditioning the way states respond to globalisation pressure, 
enlarging or reducing the room to move, as the case may be (Weiss 2003: 
302). 
 
This is an element also present in the analysis of Keohane and Miller (1996). In the 
following chapters of this text, we will focus on the responses of the state, and on the 
room in which the state moves. The domestic response to globalization is to be found 
in the public sector and the industrial policy of the state. 
2.3. Domestic policy change as a result of globalisation and 
interdependence 
Following Weiss, it seems clear that the most interesting discussion lie in the crossing 
of political economy and political science. Placing focus on what happens within the 
states might be the most fruitful way of pursuing this matter. The question then 
remains. The second image remains reversed, though it needs to be just a little sharper, 
in order to be used as a starting point in this context.  
 Within the same tradition as Gourevitch we find other scholars who have 
pondered the same issues – how does international relations and global economic 
interdependence actually manifest itself in domestic affairs? One way of answering 
that question would of course be to say that it manifests itself in different ways in 
every state, depending on the relative power of the state versus the international 
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system. This is clearly a statement we can easily subscribe to, though it gives us little 
new information. Nor does it provide us with a way to understand in what way this 
manifestation happens. 
 Keohane and Milner (1996) provide us with an answer, or at least a way to 
explain how different states respond differently to internationalization. The institutions 
mediate the impact of globalization in the various nation states. If the domestic 
institutions are weak, then the domestic impact might be high. Conversely, if the 
domestic political arena consists of strong institutions, than the impact will be lower. 
However, one of the reasons for this is that institutions inhibit the ability of the central 
government to interfere with the day-to-day business and  
 
The more authority over policy rests in the hands of independent 
bureaucratic agencies, the less policy change should be associated with a 
given change in the constellation of preferences in the private sphere 
(Garret and Lange 1996: 54).  
 
This actually means that although globalization and internationalization has some 
profound effects on all states, the level of impact and effect it has on the government’s 
ability to govern will rely much on the nature of the institutions surrounding the 
politicians. In the long run however, the institutions may also change. Garrett and 
Lange discuss the nature of internationalization, institutions and political change. 
Their model takes it as given that internationalization and changes in the world 
economy induces change in the preferences of domestic actors. Using that 
understanding as a starting point, they proceed to investigate how the governments 
respond to those changes in preferences. Using a game theoretical approach, they 
arrive at a clean and stylized modeling of how this plays out (see fig 1) (Ibid: 50). 
 The model presented by Garret and Lange proposes that exogenous changes, 
like a decrease or increase in prices will induce policy change in the domestic arena. 
The pressure from international factors is mediated through the countries position in 
the international economy, the socioeconomic institutions and the formal public 
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institutions. As we shall see in the Norwegian case, these effects are crucial in 
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Figure 1 The international economy, domestic institutions and political change (Garret and Lange 1996: 51)
The approach of Garret and Lange places the State at the center of the analysis, and 
proceed to examine how the institutions mediate the influence the changed domestic 
preferences – and how the final government policy then is affected by both institutions 
and preferences. Our task however, is to investigate what happens after the 
government has decided on a given policy. How are the tools of the government 
affected by increased interdependence, and increased rigidity on international 
regimes? While institutions play a crucial role in this view as well, the basic approach 
is somewhat different. The Garrett and Lange model does however present us with an 
opportunity to tie the theoretical components of this text together. The pressure from 
the international economy does indeed induce changes in the domestic sphere, as 
argued by both Gourevitch (1979) and Weiss (2003). And while institutions do 
mediate the influences, they are also the result of policies, and policy change in the 
states. So the influence of institutions may change over time. This shows that the 
institutions themselves can also change as a result of policy change. The role of the 
state in relation to a NOC is regulated by institutions. In the Norwegian case, as we 
shall se later, the surrounding institutions were also subject to change as a result of a 
change in the political preferences.  
 For our purposes, the institutions and agencies of the public are crucial in order 
to apprehend how the state has adapted to the new international community, and also 
to grasp the sphere of tools available for today’s states. The institutions surrounding 
the Norwegian petroleum sector for instance, have been continually changing through 
the 30-year history of Norwegian petroleum. The institutional reform has followed a 
similar pattern of that described by Garrett and Lange for predicting and understanding 
policy change. The institutions themselves are a result of a policy change. If we pare 
the theoretical approach of international economy, with the Garrett and Lange model, 
we can see how the institutions in the Norwegian petroleum sector have changed – 
from a strictly collective model to more marked based approaches. This transit in 
administration model is sometimes described as New Public Management, and was a 
popular reform wave through the 1980ies and 90ies. This “reform wave” contained, as 
we shall see, many of the elements that are connected with the idea of the diminishing 
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state. In addition, it also changed the distribution of responsibilities between the 
national oil companies and the government. 
 
2.4. The global political economy in domestic public reform 
 The trend in public management reform during the 1980ies and far into both the 
1990s and 2000 were the so-called “New Public Management” – a response to the 
increasing management and economic focus in global economic affairs. This type of 
reform was heavily advocated by international organisations like the OECD.   
This purpose of this text is not to give a complete and exhaustive account of the 
theoretical framework for new public management reform. However, without at least 
some understanding about where the ideas of reform comes from, the task of analyzing 
and identifying the relevant factors become even more complex and demanding. In 
this section we look closer at the theoretical backdrop of the reform wave.1 
 
2.4.1. Broad thinking governments and specified agencies 
The management school draws its inspiration from the private sector. In a study of one 
of the most NPM inspired countries, New Zealand, Boston et al. (1996) finds that the 
reforms in general were inspired by the economic public choice theory and 
organizational economics. They found that agency theories and transaction cost 
theories played a major role in the ideological and practical foundations of the 
reforms. In addition, the managerialism borrowed from private enterprise created 
much of the basis for reform (Boston et al.. 1996: 16).  
  “The new economic approach” as it’s sometimes called, stipulates that any 
person will act to maximise ones own goals. As citizens use political means to ensure 
basic interests, like health care and pension, politicians use their position to gain more 
power. Following this theory, the smaller the government gets, the better it gets 
(Todaro and Smith 2006: 121). In a general sense, we can say that politicians and 
                                                 
1 This sub-chapter is based on a pervious work – handed in as a term paper at the University 
of Oslo. Refereed to as Vik 2007a.  
 23
administrators adhering to this approach, views the role of the state and state agencies 
with some scepticism (Vik 2007a). 
 Another important element of these reforms relies on the relationship between 
the delegating authority and the entity delegated to. In economics and political science 
this relationship is often described as an agent-principal, where the principal delegates 
authority to an agent in order to perform a specific task or role. Politically, we can say 
that the relationship between the people and the members of parliament is a principal – 
agent relationship. The agency theory, as the public choice theory, assumes that we all 
are rational, utility maximising self-interested beings. Accordingly, the relationship 
between agents and principals must be regulated by more or less formal contracts (Ibid 
19). 
 
A good deal of agency theory, therefore, is concerned with determining – 
given various assumptions about the information available to the respective 
parties and the nature of the task undertaken – the optimal form of 
contracting, including the best way to motivate agents (Ibid). 
 
As we shall see, reforms inspired by NPM ideas focus a great deal on contracts and the 
formal divisions between the political and administrative levels of public management.  
 Management focus are said to be the very foundation of new public 
management. The theory borrows many central elements from organisation theory, 
and from practices in private enterprises. According to Boston, the proponents of this 
particular way of organising public management are mainly practitioners and private 
sector consultants. Management theory consists of various lessons from private 
companies, and corporate ways of thinking. The foundation of management theory 
rests on the idea that management is something pure and instrumental – an activity that 
bases itself on principles that can just as easy be applied to public management as to 




2.4.2. A new distribution of responsibilities 
According to Hood (1995) the basis of NPM reforms in the eighties lay in two distinct 
changes from the “old”, Weberian public management. Firstly, the NPM reforms 
consisted of downplaying and removing the differences between the public and the 
private sector. Secondly, NPM means a change in the public sector from process 
accountability in the direction of increased focus on result accountability (Hood 1995: 
94).  
 New Public Management separates itself from the “old” public management in 
many ways. Most important is the emphasis it places on vertical and horizontal 
specialisation. The most crucial point is the vertical specialisation – the creation and 
structural devolution of power to these agencies (Vik 2007b). 
 Horizontal specialisation means that units with multiple tasks are being divided 
into several units with one, or few, focus areas. We can say that a common 
denominator for both vertical and horizontal specialisation is the creation and 
structural devolution of agencies. Talbot (summarized in Christensen and Lærgreid 
2004) has identified three central features of agencies: 
 
1. Structural disaggregating, brought about by the creation of single purpose 
organisations 
2. Performance management conducted by specifying contracts and performance 
targets, monitoring, reporting and assessment 
3. Deregulation attained by delegating control over personnel, finance and other 
managerial tasks (Christensen and Lægreid 2004) 
 
The main components of NPM are hands-on professional management, 
which allows for active, visible, discretionary control of an organisation by 
people who are free to manage; explicit standards of performance; a greater 
emphasis on output control; increased competition; contracts; devolution; 
disaggregating of units; and private sector management techniques 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2001: 19). 
 
2.5. Theoretical expectations 
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Tto arrive at some expectations regard
he level of abstract in the theories of Weiss, and Garret and Lange makes it important 
ing the empirical data we shall analyze in the 
changing the government’s role in the market in some cases from participant to 
observer.  
a consequence of the institutions framing the sector, the 
following. Through the works of Garret and Lang, as well as Keohane and Miller, we 
see the line of thought going from the international to the national and local. In theory, 
the states respond to increasing interdependence and the globalization of the 
marketplace by changes in policy. In the 1980ies and 90ies, the trend was for states to 
apply a more business-oriented approach to public sector institutions – thereby 
 From Garret and Lange’s model of policy change, we derive that the change of 
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Figure 2 Domestic preferences, institutions and international pressure 
socioeconomic and formal public institutions. The overall change in preferences in the 
domestic political arena then gives the policy makers either room to maneuver, or 
constricts them.  
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 The following analysis is based on the broad theoretical framework of Linda 
Weiss, and from that theory, we arrive at three basic assumptions for the empirical 
data.  
 (i) The states role vis-à-vis the market and the NOC have changed because of 
both changes in domestic preferences and international pressure. This has led to 
institutional reform and changes in the mainstream political attitude towards using the 
NOC to attain national interests in the sector.  
 (ii) The states ability to control the NOC is constrained as a consequence of 
domestic institutional reform, and participation in rigid international regimes.  
 In addition, (iii) the state may also be given an extended room to use the NOC, 
as a consequence of interdependence, through global political currents.   
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3.0. Ambition, exploration and control in the North Sea 
Energy politics is said to be the “commanding heights” of politics. Energy political 
issues have been on the agenda of nations since the middle of the nineteenth century. 
Hence, the role of national oil companies have been thoroughly debated, both in 
political and academic contexts. Several aspects have influenced the relationship 
between the NOCs and the states. And, as mentioned, the different political 
dispositions of those who occupy the government offices may have a very great deal 
of influence over how this relationship evolves.  
 Following Garret and Lange (1996), policy change and the change in 
perceptions in the domestic political arena can be explained as a consequence of 
factors that are exogenous to domestic politics. In other words, the international 
political economy induces political change. In this chapter the focus lie on the 
Norwegian petroleum policy and the change of institutional policy during the 1990ies 
and early 2000.   
 
3.1. Statoil – a cornerstone in the Norwegian petroleum policy 
December 23, 1969 the Phillips Ocean Viking drilling platform finished drilling the 
thirty-third well on the Norwegian continental shelf. This was to be the Norwegian 
moon landing. Shortly after the find, Ed Jobin from Phillips called the industry 
department in Norway with the following words: “I think we got an oil field here”. 
The call would change the economic and political reality in Norway inn all foreseeable 
future (Lerøen 2006: 35).  
The first exploration well on the Norwegian shelf was drilled over 40 years ago, and it 
is more than 30 years since Statoil first discovered oil. In 2003, over 77 000 people 
were employed in the Norwegian petroleum industry. In a country of 4.5 million 
people, that’s a lot of people. Oil and gas is without doubt the most important business 
in Norway. The petroleum industry has contributed more than 1 700 billion NOK to 
the state treasury (in 2003 money), and will continue to make a substantial economic 
and technological contribution in the years to come. In 2003 the petroleum sector 
accounted for 19 percent of the Norwegian GDP – twice the combined revenue from 
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the industry, and more than 15 timed the total value creation in agriculture and the 
primary industries (OED 2003: 10). 
 The history of the Norwegian oil adventure is hung on a timeline of geological 
and technological discovery. For Statoil, much of the company’s feeling of self is 
linked to the discovery and development of the Gullfaks field. The American oil and 
industry adventure is said to have started with the oil discovery at Spindeltop. 
According to Lerøen (2006), the same can be said about the Norwegian adventure and 
the discovery of the Gullfaks field (Lerøen 2006: 11). 
 From the first discovery of oil in Norway, to the establishment of Statoil, and 
the Norwegian oil policy we know today, many different approaches were discussed 
and evaluated. Although different in form, the basic grounding of the Norwegian 
policies in this sector has always been to try combining the effects of some 
international competition with a strong national presence (Ibid). The development of 
petroleum policy in the North Sea could “be seen as two separate learning processes” 
(Noreng 1980: 13). This is true both for both the UK and Norwegian shelves – where 
the international petroleum corporations met two states with no experience in the 
industry, but with a strong desire to make the petroleum work for the states, and not 
just for the corporations. The desire was that the oil and gas period would be an era 
and not an episode (Lerøen 2006: 17). This realisation from the young petroleum 
states in the North Sea can be seen as the first sign of the “oil revolution” that gained 
footing in the early 1970ies (Noreng 1980: 14 – 15).  
 The first learning process is the one of the states – in which the states learned 
the basic economy of the industry, and how to use these to gain control over the 
corporations. The second and equally important process belongs to the corporations. 
During the first years of activity in the North Sea the corporations discovered that their 
activities in the region would be subject to a considerably stricter regulatory regime 
than had been the case in the USA and the developing countries where they had 
previously been (Ibid).  
 After the finding of oil in the North Sea came the discussion about how the 
government was to organise the state participation in the petroleum sector. In the 
beginning, the Norwegian government did two important moves. Firstly, the 
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government in Norway started to see how the concessionary system could be used in 
the context at hand. In the USA and various developing countries the international oil 
companies had been virtually sovereign in matter of “exploration, development and 
depletion policy” (Ibid: 13). The governments in both Norway and the UK early 
displayed a disliking of this manner of organising the petroleum sector. They wanted 
more control. However, the new petroleum states in the North Sea needed the 
competence to develop the recourses.  
 
Consequently, the governments and the energy industry found themselves 
in a bargaining situation. Neither side can do without the other, but they 
have diverging interests, perceptions and demands (Ibid: 19) 
      
The bargaining follows two conflict lines. The first being the distribution on income 
between the bargaining parties, and the second being the distribution of power 
between the parties.  
 In Norway we can say that the relationship between the government and Statoil 
have passed through four different stages – each with its own set of challenges.  
 (i) The first stage is the “Era of National Governance” which lasted from 1965 
to 1980. This stage was, as the name indicates, an era where the national interests were 
the guiding principles in the petroleum policy.  
 
The regulations put in place by the Norwegian government amount to a 
legislative framework giving the state ultimate control over the resources, a 
politically governed concession system, and a strong element of direct state 
participation through the state oil company – Statoil (Claes 2003: 49). 
 
 It was also in this stage that the organizational culture in Norwegian petroleum related 
organizations were constructed. We can say that the roots of this culture stem from this 
period in time.  
 (ii) By internal political challenges we mean that in the period from 1981 to 
1984 there was political strife around the role of Statoil as a NOC. The government at 
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the time, a centre-right government led by Kåre Willoch, thought both the state and 
Statoil would be better off by loosening the states grip on the company. The 
government then proposed a series of changes to policy, which deviated from the 
“traditional” Norwegian way of looking at energy politics and state ownership. The 
internal policy changes in this period were also driven by external events, such as the 
oil price fall, prompting a change in the distributional pressure for policy. The Garret 
and Lange (1996) model helps us understand how this external economic factor caused 
a domestic policy change.  
 
While the main tendency in Norway since 1945 has been to integrate 
organized interests, and thus social conflicts, into the administrative 
apparatus, the key argument of the concervative-center government was 
that the state, in order to govern, needed a certain distance from the various 
interests (Olsen and March, quoted in Ibid: 50). 
 
The change in policy meant that the direct involvement of the state in the sector was 
split from Statoil, and placed in a new agency called The State’s direct share of 
economic involvement (SDØE) - leaving the operator responsibility in the hands of 
Statoil. Contrary to what one might believe, the background for this initiative were not 
to reduce the power of politicians over Statoil, but to reduce the power of Statoil over 
politicians.  
 
The challenge to the existing model thus was not a matter of liberalization, 
in the meaning of privatization; rather, it was a matter of changing the 
balance between two government entities, the state oil company firm and 
the ministry of Oil and Energy in favour of the latter (Ibid: 51). 
 
However, the vertical specialization conducted by Willoch can be seen as a prelude to 
privatization. After the change, Statoil became more like a normal company, more 
governed by market principles – but still owned by the state. Yet the state-company 
relationship still was much closer than what we see today. It can be argued that this 
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gave the reform another dimension as well. Since the result of the reform was a 
structural devolution – it made it easier to privatize later. When the price of oil fell in 
the last quarter of 1980 this became a central topic (ibid). 
 (iii) And (iv) the two next stages: external political challenges and globalization 
challenge is sufficiently similar to treat them as one stage. They both led to what was 
now a politically potent discussion about privatization of Statoil. 
 The external pressure on the Norwegian government to reform its petroleum 
policy came in two clear forms. Firstly it came in the form of rules, through the 
Norwegian membership in the European Single Market. These rules sought to split the 
Norwegian state control in the energy sector – with special emphasis on the 
downstream ownership. It also came in the form of the decline of oil prices and the 
following economic crisis in the sector. Though the effect was mediated through 
institutions, the government eventually decided to fully delegate the company 
managing to the company itself – leaving the government to do the broad thinking. 
  
3.2. Privatisation of Statoil  
The privatization of Statoil had the stated purpose of yielding the following two main 
results. Firstly the idea was that a partly privatized company would be more efficient 
than one totally owned by the state. Secondly, the goal was to separate the political 
level from the administrative/production level, with special emphasis on separating the 
roles of the state as owner and as administrative authority (OED, White Paper 36 
(2000 – 2001)). 
  The position of the government was that total state ownership in Statoil no 
longer was necessary to maintain central national interests in the petroleum sector. 
They regarded both the financial and the political interests as attainable through tax- 
and concession rules, and through laws and regulations. They also specified in the 
White Paper outlining the reform that “the Norwegian membership in the EEA means 
that the ownership in Statoil cannot be used for political purposes, even though one 
could wish the opposite” (Ibid). We return to the European/Legal framework in 
chapter six. 
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 Due to change in the constraints in macroeconomic performance and a change 
in the governments receptiveness to economic change, the international pressure to 
change the way the government related to the industry were huge. This came from the 
EU, and from the OECD – both in the form of myths and attitudes, but also in the form 
of specific rules. In other words, the environmental perspectives do have a large 
explanatory force when it comes to this specific area of politics.  
 Secondly, the institutional aspect seems relevant in the sense that privatisation 
only came after a process through over 20 years. The normative institutional structures 
framing the Norwegian petroleum sector were robust – meaning that not only did this 
take many, many years, but also the political leadership seemed genuinely interested in 
making this a consensus decision.  
 There are several elements in the reform of Statoil and the general relationship 
between the company and the ministry of petroleum and energy that bear resemblance 
to NPM. In the beginning, Statoil were a NOC with both an economic and a political 
mandate. The political control of the company was direct and detail oriented. The 
initial reform started by Willoch meant that the political thinking and strategising were 
to be transferred solely to the political leadership in the government, while Statoil was 
to focus on the business end of the chain. Said with the NPM vocabulary, this meant a 
vertical specialization of the petroleum politics and policy. The leaders were to “steer 
not row” as it’s sometimes said in the NPM literature.  
 One of the consequences of the vertical specialisation was that the door was 
opened to other NPM inspired reforms, notably the privatisation of Statoil. 
Privatisation and market orienting of previous state agencies are a well-known reform 
element in the NPM family (Vik 2007).  
 As the reform of Norwegian petroleum policy shows, the relationship between 
the state and the NOC has changed considerably the last 20 years. Much of the change 
can also be attributed to effects of economic globalisation – such as decline in 
petroleum prices and falling international regard for large public sectors.   
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4.0. Interests and Government use of NOC  
One of the most central, but also one of the most illusive terms in political science is 
interests. We often state that national interests are important in determining how a 
state might act in a certain context. In this paper the term interests plays a crucial role 
– since the main task of the paper is to find out whether the state can utilize a NOC in 
order to fulfil some basic interests. In other words, we need to find a model and a 
typology that will enable us to better grasp this illusive term. After we understand how 
the interests might play out, we can move on to the manner in which the state can use 
the NOC – meaning what different tools the state has to its disposal, and what different 
roles the state can take in its relationship with the NOC. When we have a clear 
understanding of both interests and the different methods available to the state, we can 
begin to look at the contextual aspect.  
 
4.1. Political and Economic interests 
In the context of state ownership we can differentiate between two main types of 
interests: those that are of a purely economic character and those that are more 
political. This principle is also evident in the Norwegian government’s statements 
concerning ownership. There are companies that have a purely economic mandate 
from the government, and there are companies that have a more mixed mandate. The 
Norwegian government has a direct ownership in 47 companies, with responsibilities 
distributed over 12 ministries (MPE 2007). In the following we shall label those 
companies with strictly economic tasks as commercial national companies, and the 
remaining just National Companies. The fact that the government chooses to make this 
split between their companies gives us a hint that we can split the term National 
Interests in this case into the same two boxes. The government i.e. the ministry in 
charge of a given NOC has both political and economic interests in the company.  
 
4.2. Regional, national and international interests 
We can further classify the governmental or national interests from a geographic 
standpoint. Some interests are mostly concerned with the national level – like 
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increasing the R&D for example, that benefits the entire nation. Other interests, like 
maintaining settlements in the northern part of Norway obviously have a regional 
dimension. Likewise, whether the headquarters of the new StatoilHydro Corporation 
lies in Stavanger or Oslo has little or no effect on national issues, but is of a rather 
important character for the people working in the two corporations current offices in 
Stavanger and Oslo, not to talk about the municipal authorities and the regional 
business communities.2 Following this model, interests could also be placed at the 
international or geopolitical level. Considering that the focus here is on the energy 
sector, international considerations might manifest themselves both in political and 
economic contexts.   
  Different interests and political problems can thus be classified within six 
categories, as wee can see in table 1. Note that this is strictly an operational move, and 





 Political Economic 
Regional   
National    
International   
Table 1 Classification of Interests 
 
4.3. Ways to utilize a NOC – roles of states 
On the abstract level, the state might position itself in various ways in relation to a 
NOC. Tore Grønlie (1990b) have identified five different roles the state might take on 
as an owner of large industry corporations. It is my understanding, that while his 
                                                 
2 In the aftermath of the decision to merge the two companies the discussions have centred on 
name choices and where the headquarters will be. This is an interesting topic for 
organisational research, but falls well outside the frames of this text.  
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objective was to describe state involvement in industry in general, that these roles also 
are useful tools for understanding government activity in our specific sector.  
 The five roles can be described as; the Entrepreneur role ; the conductor role; 
the proponent of national values and interests; the social reformer role; and, the crisis 
solver role (Grønlie 1990b: 3).  
 The entrepreneur role describes a situation where the state uses its ownership in 
industry, as well as other means, in order to secure and improve the national industrial 
basis. The entrepreneurial government will use its position to undertake tasks such as 
exploiting resources not considered fit for commercial use (yet) or create jobs or job 
opportunities in rural parts of the country. A common denominator for these tasks is 
that they are either economically unsound or they are associated with high risks (Ibid: 
15). The conductor role means a more subtle government involvement. The state tries 
to increase the control and organization in the economy – through controlling 
monopolies, or directing production efforts (Ibid; Norheim 2003; 8). The conductor 
role fits well as a description of much governmental economic activity in the post-war 
period, and in fascist Italy and Nazi Germany (Grønlie 1990b: 17). 
 The state may also use its role in industrial development to further national 
values and interests. In this context, the state tries to secure national ownership of 
natural resources, and to secure that the revenues of economic activity based on these 
resources contributes in positive way to the society as a whole. Self-sufficiency plays a 
major part in state dispositions, both in this role and in the closely related social 
reformer role. Here the state uses its power not only to secure economic objectives, but 
also to balance out injustices in the business sector. The social distribution of power 
both within the company and in the rest of the society is sought adjusted. One popular 
way of using state ownership and economic involvement for this end is to further 
worker participation and to enforce a more social business leadership style (Ibid; 16).  
 The most passive of Grønlies five roles is the crisis solver role. Here the state 
uses its power to avert a specific crisis – for instance if a private company wishes to 
flag out, or to close production facilities which are crucial for i.e. rural societies (Ibid). 
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 A cross country comparison of government economic involvement does 
highlight some national differences, but the most valuable lesson is the similarities and 
the murkiness of the real world compared to the theoretical world.  
 
If we try this role pattern on the motive- and target complexes in different 
countries we find many similarities. The most important one being that in 
most of the countries the state is placed in multiple roles at the same time – 
and that we may well find elements of most roles in most countries at some 
point in time (Ibid 16).   
 
There are however crucial national differences. For our purposes, the most important 
point is the variation over time. In light of the theoretical perspectives presented earlier 
in the text, the expectation is that the government involvement in economic affairs, 
and the way the state understands its relations to NOCs have drifted from the more 
active roles in direction of the more subtle roles.  
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5.0. Political context  
When one chose the model of establishing a pure national oil company in 
stead of building on the state dominated Norsk Hydro, this had its reasons. 
One of the main reasons was the desire to give this company [Statoil] a 
privileged position in relation to other companies where private interests 
were represented. I feel the need to issue a reminder about this, as 
somebody seem to think that it is not right that Statoil is given a privileged 
position – this was the very the very premise of the company (Labour Party 
representative Gunnar Berge, referred to in Lie 2005: 31).    
 
In general, we can distinguish five different mechanisms through which the 
government can exercise control in the energy market: (i) the government can exercise 
control through regulating the access to the industry, as it does today through the 
modified concession system; (ii) the control can be exercised through the actual 
enterprise; (iii) the government can control the actors behaviour as sellers of the 
industry’s end product; (iv) Governments also have the option to regulate the actors 
behaviour towards each other through the competition rules; And (v) the government 
can exert control by  regulating the distribution of the financial output (Arnesen 1996). 
In this analysis the focus is placed on what happens if the government should decide to 
use mechanism number two, to engage actively in the market. 
 The political preferences in Norway and the international community play a 
significant role in determining how the relationship between the government and the 
NOC shall be. 
 Traditionally the Norwegian government has been very active in the control of 
the energy market. Most notably the state controlled the market through the 
mechanisms of regulating access to the industry, through the concessionary system, 
and through actually taking part in the running of Statoil. Taxes have always been high 
on the Norwegian shelf. In this respect the government has ensured that a great portion 
of the financial output from the industry can be used in other sectors such as healthcare 
and the pension system. Currently, the Norwegian pension fund (set up by the 
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revenues from the oil industry) is worth 1 939 billon NOK (Norges Bank 2007). This 
represents a political will to regulate the industry through the distribution of the 
financial income. In this way the government, and the political near consensus of 
saving the revenue for future needs, ensures a stable, long term benefit from the 
petroleum industry. 3 
 After a period of decreased focus on government participation in industry 
through ownership, the current government has taken a somewhat different approach. 
Norwegian politics until the last parliament elections were characterized by either 
minority Labour Party governments or coalitions on the centre-right. The political 
understanding of state ownership is one of the areas where the change to the current 
centre-left government (the government today consist of the Labour Party, The Centre 
Party and the Socialist Left Party). Later in this chapter we shall take a closer look at 
the governments current political dispositions in the ownership domain. First, 
however, we need to grasp the political context from a more historic point of view.   
 Tranøy, Jordfald and Løken (2007) describe the context of government 
ownership as a combination of the economic-political regime, the current trade and 
industry policy and the different available models of control. The Norwegian 
economic-political regime can be described as “the Nordic model”, where the 
socioeconomic models prescribe a modest and solitary salary policy, in open economic 
models. In the Nordic model the financial and monetary policies are set in context with 
the welfare politics. (Tranøy, Jordfald and Løken 2007: 11 – 13). This has had an 
effect on how the government has positioned itself relative to other market actors. 
  
5.1. Historic roles and mechanisms  
When the international companies first found oil on the Norwegian shelf, neither the 
politicians nor the bureaucrats in Norway knew anything about petroleum politics. 
Kåre Willoch, a prominent Norwegian politician reflects in hindsight that the 
understanding at the time was that “oil was something they found in the dessert” 
(Hanisch 1992:129).  
                                                 
3 The Norwegian Progress Party (FRP) is the only party who has signalled a will to spend the 
oil revenues in a shorter time frame than the other parties (FRP 2007: 20). 
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 Noreng (1980) describes the exploration of the North Sea as two learning 
processes. One where the states learn the new business, and one where the companies 
learn that the states along the north sea (UK and Norway) will not behave in the same 
manner as the other petroleum states at that time. The first learning process was the 
one who were to determine the political relationship between the Norwegian 
government and the petroleum industry. 
 
The quietly expectant state 
During the first years of activity on the Norwegian shelf, the government was leaning 
back, taking a rather quiet expectant role in the petroleum development. The 
Kontinentalsokkelutvalget (continental base committee) was created by Royal 
resolution 8 November 1963. The mandate of the committee was to make a 
recommendation to the government on how to organize the states approach to the 
petroleum sector. The committee came back with a proposal in tree parts. The third of 
which stressed that the ministry of trade an industry should have the day-to-day 
responsibility of handling the concessions and the industry in general. To do this they 
proposed the establishing of an advisory committee to help the ministry, who did not 
have the competence to do this. Hence, “Oljerådet” (oil council) was established early 
in 1965. The understanding in the beginning was that the government should use 
mechanisms of control restricted to controlling the market from the outside. The 
country was still early in the learning process, and the competence of petroleum policy 
was scarce. However, the trend was that the government’s activity in the sector was 
gradually increasing (Hanisch 1992: 141ff). 
 Using Grønlies (1990b) five roles of the state, the state in this time period chose 
to act more as a conductor. The government tried to control the petroleum industry by 
creating rigid rules around the concession, and at the same time trying to learn as 
much as possible from the industry and from other countries that had experience with 





The socially reforming entrepreneur 
In the last rounds of negotiating the concessions, the government, in cooperation with 
the Phillips Group decided to add a reservation for state participation in all new 
concessions. This meant that the government took a much more radical stance in the 
negotiations than was expected by the other parties (ibid). 
 In the summer of 1970, the young Hydro officer Arve Johnsen, who was also 
the leader of the Labour Party Committee on industry, wrote that the finding of oil was 
to have a profound influence on the future of Norway. He also stated that  
 
We can not leave to a negotiation committee to decide on a case-by-case 
basis what solution to seek – whether the regard for Norway or to the 
individual oil company. In this context one consideration is more important 
than all the others, and that is the socioeconomic consequences for Norway. 
The second we allow landing of oil in another country than Norway, we 
have shifted the distribution of power in the favour of a private oil company 
(Ibid: 163).4 
 
Through the 1970ies and 80ies, the Norwegian government action in the petroleum 
sector more resembled a combination of the conductor, the entrepreneur and the social 
reformer. The Norwegian parliaments expanded industry committee of 1970 – 71 laid 
out the “10 commandments” of Norwegian petroleum policy in their proposal to the 
parliament (Inst. S. Nr 294 1970 – 71). They proposed that 
 
- National control and governing must be secured for all activities on the 
Norwegian continental shelf, 
- the discoveries are exploited in such a way that Norway becomes 
independent of oil imports, 
- the development of an oil industry need to happen under the necessary 
regard for the existing industry and to nature and environmental concerns, 
                                                 
4 The quote is from a meeting in the Norwegian oil directorate, may 1973, and referred in 
Hanisch 1992. The translation is mine. 
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- burning of usable natural gas on the Norwegian continental shelf can not be 
accepted except for shorter trial periods, 
- petroleum from the Norwegian continental shelf as a rule is landed in 
Norway, with the exemption for the single cases where sociopolitical 
considerations give reasons for other solutions, 
-  the state is involved in all practical levels, contribute to a coordination of 
Norwegian interests within the Norwegian petroleum industry and to the 
formation of a Norwegian integrated oil community with both national and 
international aims, 
- a state owned oil company is set up to safeguard the national financial 
interests and have a purposeful cooperation with the domestic and 
international oil interests, 
- in the areas north of the 62* latitude a level and pattern of activity is chosen 
that satisfy the special sociopolitical considerations that is associated with 
that part of country, 
- bigger Norwegian petroleum discoveries will present the ministry of foreign 
affairs with new tasks (ibid: 638) 
 
As we can se, the committee set out a rather ambitious course of action. And, the 
petroleum policies in Norway through the 1970ies and 80ies did actually follow this 
ambitious course. The government in this period took an entrepreneurial role in the 
industry, and used several of the mechanisms presented above. Most notably, the 
government control with Statoil was big, and so was the role Statoil was given by the 
government in this period. One crucial element was the use of the so-called gliding 
scale. This was a rule according to which Statoil could choose its share of the field 
after the discovery, and the cost of development were divided among the other 
companies (Claes 2003; Lie 2005: 31) in these years the government in Norway 
actually used all the mechanisms described by Arnesen (1996). Previously Statoil also 
had a paragraph 10 in its statuettes, demanding that all cases that seemed politically 
potent were to be addressed in the General Meeting. Calling a General Meeting in the 
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times before the privatization of Statoil did after all involve calling one person 
(Sandnes 2006: 60). 
 
Crisis solving through backing off 
When the prices of oil began to drop in the mid eighties the approach of the 
government to petroleum policy changed. As we saw from Garret and Lange (1996), 
the presence of an international economic factor changed the preferences of domestic 
actors, and in turn the policy of the government. Through the institutional changes 
already mentioned, the government distanced themselves from the petroleum industry 
– first through the vertical devaluation of responsibility, then trough the partly 
privatization of Statoil. These moves meant that the government chose to fall back to a 
more crisis solver role in their use of the ownership, and continued to exercise control 
through the concessionary system and the taxation system, thus maintaining the use of 
the other four mechanisms. This has been the situation from the privatization in 2001 
until the election in 2005.  
 
5.2. Ownership discourses in Norway  
Though the actual use of the government ownership in Norway was rather stable 
during the last two governments, the discourse still retained a left-right dimension. The 
government who privatized the company were a Labour government (following the 
lead of the “third way” from Giddens, as explained by among others Tony Blair). The 
next government from the centre-left spectrum (Bondevik 2) of the political sphere 
took the specialization of Statoil a step further in their ownership whitepaper, 
stipulating a “Smaller and better state ownership” (NHD 2002). 
 According to Per Tore Woie (2000), former vice prime minister in the 
Bondevik 1 government, their view was that any large concentration of ownership in 
the economy was a bad thing – regardless of whether the ownership was public or 
private. Further, the government took the view that the scope of public ownership in 
Norway was determined more by historic coincidences than deliberate planning from 
the state (Woie 2000: 68).  
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 Woie also expresses concern about the structure of ownership in Statoil, stating 
that his government was in the process of evaluating the structure (Ibid: 75). However, 
his government fell, and a Labour Party government took over. The Labour party 
government then followed the proposition from the board of Statoil to partly privatize 
the company.  
 The Bondevik 2 government proposed to reduce the state share in the 
companies where the ownership is not a part of the sector political administration. The 
government also stated that in companies whose purpose was purely financial, the 
onus of proof were on those who advocate continued ownership (NHD 2002: 78). 
They also reflect on the companies, such as Statoil, where the financial and judicial 
framework for the enterprise is changing.  
 
Some companies where the ownership is a part of the sector political 
instruments undergoes a commercialization process, among other things 
because of liberalization of markets and the implementation of new 
regulative regimes. For these companies there is reason to believe that the 
ownership might over time loose its meaning as a sector political instrument 
(ibid). 
 
The Bondevik 2 government raised an important question in asking for the prudence in 
continuing with large ownerships in companies that were no part of the policy 
instruments.  
 Tore Grønlie (2000) describes the state ownership as the act of trying to 
combine two different types of activity – business and politics, and stresses that this is 
not always an easy task. Although historic coincidences might play a role in 
determining the scope of ownership, and how the state came to involve itself in the 
market, the state never enter a business solely on the basis of making money or 
administering values (Grønlie 2000:81).  
 As we have seen, the governments of Norway have historically been rather 
active in the petroleum sector. In the choice between both roles and mechanisms 
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available, the governments have tended to use a fairly broad spectrum of policy 
instruments.        
 
5.3. Government today – interests and track record  
The current government is a coalition of the Labour Party, the Socialist Left Party 
(SV) and the Centre Party. Of these three, SV is the only party who has never been in 
government before.  
 During the parliament election campaign in 2005, the parties represented in the 
government all campaigned to increase state ownership, and that the government 
should play a more important role in the market. The discussion of the states role in 
the market was exemplified during the campaign with the company Norske Skog, who 
planned to close their “Union” plant in Skien, Norway (Tranøy and Sørheim 2006: 
39). The proposed closing of this plant came in the middle of the election – and hence 
got a huge amount of attention from both the press and the politicians. In the heat of 
the campaign, many politicians proposed solutions to this closing that would involve 
that the state entered the plant on the owner side. Another proposition was extensive 
public-private partnerships in which the goal was to change the primary task of the 
plant from producing newspaper paper to producing paper for books. A third solution 
was that some private investors, notably the Norwegian investors Øystein Stray 
Spetalen and Peter Stordalen (an investor that recently has emerged as somewhat of a 
corporate idealist, if such a thing exist) took 100 million NOK to the table to create a 
solution. However, none of the solutions made any progress (Ibid: 40). 
 The leader of the Labour Party said to the newspaper Dagsavisen that “A red-
green government would usher an active industry policy, which hopefully can avoid 
closings like the one we saw at Union” (Dagsavisen 05.10.2005). Representatives 
from SV were also very disappointed following the closing of the plant (SV 2005).  
 The parties who were to form the new government then wanted the state to act 
as a crisis solver, and as an entrepreneur in this case, either by going into ownership in 
the company, or by other stimulus aimed at persuading Norske Skog not to close the 
plant.  
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 Mechanism vise, the government parties have all stated in their programs that 
they favor an active ownership policy. The Centre Party (SP) states that:  
 
The Centre party sees it as a main task to provide rules for, and to use 
policy instruments that secure local and national ownership. The Centre 
party is convinced that the best way of securing national resources and 
national interests is through interplay between an active state and a chiefly 
private and Norwegian ownership (SP 2005, my translation). 
 
  The Labour Party (AP) also drew on national ownership as a mechanism to reach 
sector political goals. In their program for the period 2005 to 2009, we find the 
following paragraph on state ownership. 
 
The state is a large owner in Norwegian industry. Public ownership can 
secure important political objectives like cantonal politics, transport 
politics, culture and health politics. In addition to this, state ownership can 
secure domestic control over the natural resources. State ownership can 
secure income to the community, and can be crucial to ensure national 
ownership and national anchoring of key enterprise in Norway. The Labour 
party wants a strong public and national ownership also in the future. As an 
owner, the state must remain professional, and give companies that compete 
in the market equally good conditions as their competitors (AP 2005: 27, 
my translation). 
 
The Socialist Left Party (SV) is, as the name might suggest, the party in the coalition 
who places itself furthest to the left in the political spectrum. It is common to expect a 
stronger desire to se the states interact in the market, the further to the left one gets. In 
their program for the same period, we find these paragraphs on public ownership.  
 
SV opposes privatisation and deregulation of public services. The welfare 
state should be strengthened and not weakened. SV wants power and 
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responsibilities to be given back to the politicians, and to strengthen public 
ownership. A nonnegotiable goal, and an important strategy against 





Through state ownership we will influence the companies to develop long-
term strategies with information development and innovation as key 
elements (Ibid).   
 
The parties seemed to be in sync when it comes to the generalities of public industrial 
policy, and that the state should play a role as both a crisis solver, an entrepreneur and 
as a social reformer.  
 
What has happened?  
During the campaign, a lot of focus was placed on industrial policy and ownership. In 
their article “Sølibatets politiske økonomi” (the celibacy political economy), Tranøy 
and Sørheim looks at what happened with the government involvement in industry 
after the election. According to the Tranøy and Sørheim, the election was succeeded 
by a deafening silence regarding the states role. And the attempts by media and Labour 
representatives were met by a well known rhetoric claiming that the state-market 
relationship must not be colluded, and that the state can not intervene in the market 
(Tranøy and Sørheim 2006: 40). 
 In the realm of state ownership, the government has indeed taken a new stand, 
compared to previous governments, at least on paper. In the next chapter, we shall take 




5.4. Whitepapers and public reviews [government policy today]  
SV, AP and SP agreed on a political platform for the government. That plan was 
negotiated in a conference centre called Soria Moria, and hence it took that name. The 
Soria Moria Declaration was signed 13 October 2005. 5 
 The program sentiments from the three parties are carried on in the declaration, 
albeit in a less inflammatory language than before. The paragraph on public ownership 
from the Labour Party program is, almost, the same as the declaration. In the Soria 
Moria declaration, we can read that: 
 
The state is a large owner in the Norwegian industry. State ownership 
secures the national control of our mutual natural resources, and secures 
funds for the community. State ownership may be crucial to secure a 
national ownership and a national anchorage of key enterprise in Norway in 
the years to come. Government ownership is important to secure important 
political objectives within cantonal politics, transport politics, culture 
politics and health politics (AP, Sv, Sp 2005: 24). 
 
The Soria Moria Declaration set out the course for the governments work on 
ownership, and other mechanisms for control of the market. Both the individual parties 
programs and the declaration appear to place emphasis on the states roles as an 
entrepreneur and social reformer. This requires a more extensive use of the ownership 
mechanism. As well as regulating the market from the outside. AP and especially SV 
state interests that could be attained by using the state ownership. They also state that 
state owned companies should take the lead in working for gender equality (ibid). 
 In the declaration the government, also states that they will seek to find new 
control mechanisms and models in the political economy in both domestic and global 
affairs. This begs the question of what this actually means. In the ownership discourse, 
the government seems to follow a well-known political and economic path.  
                                                 
5 The negotiation committee consisted of Jens Stoltenberg, Hill-Marta Solberg and Martin 
Kolberg from the Labour Party, Kristin Halvorsen, Øystein Djupedal and Henriette Westhrin 
from SV, as well as Åslaug Haga, Marit Arnstad and Magnild Meltveit Kleppa from SP. It is 
worth noting that Marit Arnstad is now interim Director of the Board of Statoil.  
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Recommendations from the ownership committee  
In 2004, the minister of Trade and Industry was handed the propositions from 
“Statseierskapsutvalget” (the committee on government ownership). The committee 
was established by royal resolution in 2002, with the mandate to take a close look at 
both the management of, and the organization of the states ownership in companies 
where the purpose of the ownership was mainly of a financial nature. The committee 
was also asked to suggest new models for organizing the states ownership 
(Statseierskapsutvalget 2004: 9).  
 In essence, the committee found that the state could use the ownership to attain 
other goals than the purely financial, although the decisions to do so must follow the 
appropriate channels. The research conducted by the committee did show that some of 
the leaders of companies where the state were a big shareholder found that other 
private owners often wanted a “state discount”. This can best be described as a 
financial safeguard for situations where the state tries to use the ownership powers to 
attain objectives other than the purely financial. Some of the leaders said that 
government representatives talking about measures not discussed in the general 
assembly was one the things that could trigger such an insecurity amongst the private 
owners (ibid: 12 -14). 
 The key proposition from the committee was that the state always should 
clarify its objectives. That the state objectives may be more complex than those of a 
private investor should not discourage the state from being very clear and upright in its 
relation to the company. This is as much a way to ensure that the state is not held 
liable to objectives it does not have. A move that would reduce the uncertainty 
involved with public-private cooperation. The committee also proposed that the state 
owned companies take a leading role in the work with corporate social responsibility, 
a corporate role that is not purely financial. (ibid).  
 The propositions from the committee are carried on in the government 
whitepaper “Et aktivt og langsiktig eierskap” (St.meld nr 13 2006 – 2007). In the 
whitepaper, the government draws a line between long term and short-term ownership, 
and between financial and industrial ownership (table 2).  
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Time horizon Financial  Industrial 
Short Term Day trader, Hedge fund  Investment fund 
Long term  Pension fund Companies and larger 
private investors 
Table 1 Types of ownership (OED 2007: 46) 
 
 The government places companies in the long-term industrial ownership 
category, while placing pension funds in the long-term financial category. This places 
the government involvement in the petroleum sector solely in the long-term arena. In 
this long-term perspective, the government presents some areas they want to focus on 
through the ownership in the companies. The focus areas include: Health, environment 
and security; research, development and competence building; environmental 
considerations; ethical business conduct; gender equality; anti corruption work, and; 
security. In addition to this it is expected that state owned companies contribute to 
smooth transitions when they relocate, close or in any other way change their business 
(Ibid: 49 – 57). 
 The starting point for the current understanding of the distribution of 
responsibilities between the company, and the government is that “the government 
determines general targets and goals, and the board of the individual corporation 
implements these goals and targets. In this way the government seeks to use the 
national ownership to attain progress in the main focus areas mentioned above (Ibid: 
49). 
 When the state chooses the limited company as a model for the ownership, it 
accepts to a certain degree that the mechanism of direct day-to-day control is made 
more difficult. Through its ownership, the state shall also contribute to the long-term 
industrial growth of the company. If follows of this that if the company is instructed to 
do something that the board find to be commercially unviable, the government then 





Petroleum and security  
In addition to the extended interests laid out in the whitepaper on state ownership, 
there are some considerations connected specifically to the petroleum industry.  
 Energy and petroleum is closely connected to questions of national security. 
Traditional IP theory tells us that this is the single most crucial national interest that 
trumps all other (Waltz 2001). According to Daniel Yergin, energy security has been 
an important international issue since Churchill decided that his navy was to use oil as 
fuel instead of coal (Yergin 2006). In this period, energy security remains on top of the 
international agenda. Instability in the Middle East, due to the war in Iraq, the crisis in 
Palestine and the nuclear dispute in Iran causes high oil prices. The trouble with the 
gas transport from Russia also causes significant ripples in the European gas market. 
In addition to this, the increase in focus on energy security is also fueled by the threat 
of terrorism (Kibsgaard 2001: 6 -8; Yergin 2006).  
 Norway has different energy security need than many other parts of the world, 
since we are largely self sufficient in energy, and is a petroleum exporting country. 
This does however not mean that the Norwegian government need not think about 
energy security. In the Norwegian case, the government needs to think about the 
possibility of an attack (by terrorists or other angry people) on the petroleum 
installations, as well as the energy security of others. As a consequence of the 
increasing international focus on energy security, the security and production of the 
installations on the Norwegian shelf has become not only a Norwegian interest, but it 
has also contributed to lifting Norway back into the geopolitical Centrum. One can 
note that western Europe only hold 2 percent of the worlds gas reserves, and imports 
over 40 percent of its gas needs (Bielecki: 2002: 248; Kibsgaard 2001). 
 In the public inquiry “Når sikkerheten er viktigst” (When security is most 
important), the issue of security in the petroleum sector is discussed. Since the sector 
consist of many private actors, state ownership as a security measure is regarded as a 
partial instrument to attain security – at least as long as the other regulative measures 




Interests and ownership 
It appears that the current Norwegian government is trying to reposition itself in 
relation to the market and the approach to ownership. In other words, this means that 
the government might try to use the mechanism of controlling the market through its 
ownership in Statoil, as a supplement to regulating the market from the outside. As we 
saw above, the preferred distribution of responsibilities is that the parliament or the 
government sets out the broader objectives, while it is up to the companies to follow 
up and implement the objectives in the day-to-day basis.  
  Based on the Soria Moria declaration, the ownership white paper and the party 
programs from the government parties – we can say that the new government wishes 
to revive some of the states previous roles in the market. We se how, and under which 
circumstances this can happen later in the text. 
 
5.5. Statoil, Hydro and StatoilHydro  
In the beginning there were three Norwegian oil companies: Saga Petroleum, Statoil 
and Norsk Hydro. Then Hydro bought Saga Petroleum, and there were two large 
Norwegian oil companies – and the state held a significant amount of shares in both 
companies. In Norsk Hydro the state had a blocking majority, meaning that the state 
could block all propositions to change the articles of incorporation. In Statoil, the state 
had an absolute majority in the general assembly (since 2001).  
 After both Hydro and Statoil were rejected as partners in the Stockman field in 
Russia, there were speculations in the Norwegian business press about a possible 
merger between the two companies (DN 2006). The press and commentators was spot 
on in their analysis. A merger plan was negotiated in secret between the two 
companies, and June 8 2007, the Norwegian parliament formally approved the merger 
between the Norsk Hydro Oil and Gas division and Statoil. October 8 the same year, 
the merger was a fact.  
 The boards announced their intention to merge in December 2006, and then 
appointed a corporate executive committee. In March 2007, the boards of the two 
companies approve the plan for the merger. In May 2007 both the European 
Commission and the US Securities and Exchange Commission approved the plan for 
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the merger. Then, when the parliament in Norway approved the plan, July 5, 
extraordinary General Meetings in Statoil and Hydro approved the merger 
(StatoilHydro 2007).  
   
The new company  
The new company is the definitively biggest Norwegian oil company. It is the biggest 
company in the Nordic region, the world’s third largest net seller of crude oil, one of 
the worlds biggest gas suppliers. StatoilHydro is the world’s largest operator of 
deepwater fields, and a world leader in using deepwater technology, and in the field of 
carbon capture and storage (ibid). 
 StatoilHydro operates 39 producing oil and gas fields around the world. Still, 
the main activity of the company is still the domestic arena.  










The government’s share in the new company is 62 percent at the time of the merger, 
with an expressed intention to increase the share to 67 percent – in accordance with the 
parliament’s decision that the state never shall own less then two thirds of Statoil 
(OED 2007b).  
 
StatoilHydro in the market  
StatoilHydro will naturally be a significant force in the Norwegian petroleum market – 
not least in the research and development area. The research and development offices 
of Hydro petroleum and Statoil merged with the rest of the company, leaving the 
question of what will happen to the sub-contractors in the innovation, research and 
development market.  
  
 When Statoil and Hydro were competing, there was a surge for innovative 
technology in both companies, giving rise to academic communities feeding the 
companies with knowledge and technology. When the two companies are no longer 
competing, that surge no longer exists. This might prove to be a fault in the long run, if 
the government does not find a way to keep these academic communities alive (OED 
2007b: 53). As the government writes in the proposition to parliament on the merger: 
 
 
The merger might present a challenge to the petroleum research in Norway, 
especially to the research and development activity at the Norwegian 
universities and research institutes (ibid). 
 
The government has a clear interest in maintaining these research and development 
communities in Norway. We shall return to how the government might proceed to do 
so.  
 While the merger is still very fresh, already there has been some controversy. 
When the merger plans were presented, one of the crucial elements was that the 
director of Norsk Hydro, Eivind Reiten was to be director of the board in 
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StatoilHydro. Reiten is not a popular man in the left side of the political spectrum 
(Tranøy and Sørheim 2006: 41).  
 Shortly before the merger, the political elite in Norway signalled a wish to 
remove Reiten from his position as director of the board in StatoilHydro. The current 
government actually called in the government lawyer to look at possible ways of 
removing Reiten (Dagbladet 2007b). 
 The same day as the merger between the two companies became a reality, 
another press release was issued from the offices of StatoilHydro. In this release it read 
that StatoilHydro now was investigating a possible corruption case from Norsk 
Hydro’s previous contracts in Libya in the late 1990ies.6 
 A case that the administration in Hydro had dismissed was regarded as a serious 
case in Statoil, and an internal investigation was launched. In a matter of days, the 
scandal had reached Reiten. And since the press storm rose in accordance with the 
increased seriousness of the situation, Reiten resigned with immediate effect, October 
4 2007 (Dagbladet 2007a; E24 2007; StatoilHydro 2007b).  
 In his place, the deputy director of the Board, Marit Arnstad took over. Marit 
Arnstad was one of the negotiators behind the Soria Moria declaration. In a more 
agency inspired institutional frame, such as the one now surrounding the Norwegian 
petroleum sector, having a director of the board that has played a big role in 
formulating the government’s interests would be a great help in controlling the 
company. 
  
5.6. International political preferences 
The theoretical expectation for state-market relation is that the states ability to use the 
NOC has been constrained. There are however many NOCs that still listen to their 
states. In the OPEC countries, the traditional model is that the state controls the 
industry – it has been this way since the fall of the seven sisters in the region.  
 Norway is in a middle position. On the one hand, the Norwegian government 
looks to the USA and Western-Europe when forming policy. On the other hand, the 
                                                 
6 The contracts in Libia did originally belong to Saga, and were transferred to Hydro when 
they took over the company. 
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most important market for Norway is the oil and gas market – and in this market the 
trendsetters are not necessarily the countries that the government most often looks to 
for public policy advice. Regardless of the normative elements in their example – two 
countries represent an interesting deviance from theory.  
 As we have seen in the Norwegian petroleum policy, and as the theory makes 
us expect the trend has been that the state downsizes its involvement in the petroleum 
sector. In Norway, the current government seems to at least rhetorically take a 
different approach.  There are especially two countries where the governments beyond 
any doubt have taken a new “hands on” approach. Both the Russian and the 
Venezuelan petroleum policy is now significantly more hands on.  
 In Russia, the government has taken back control over the National Oil 
Company, and now uses the company as well as the whole sector for political 
purposes. As I noted in a previous article (Vik 2007b), the current Russian approach to 
petroleum policy and the institutions that surround the policy closely resemble the 
Norwegian approach in the 1970ies and early 1980ies.  
 In Venezuela, the government has taken a more aggressive approach – with 
nationalizing the entire industry (Offshore 2007). This has of course led to 
international outcry, not least as Venezuela is one of the closest large petroleum 
reservoir to the USA  
 Analyzing whether the current policy development in these countries in the 
energy sector is prudent or nor, falls outside the scope of this text. One may note 
though, that the actions of the Russians and the Venezuelans create some international 
precedence for retaining control with the national oil company. It also signifies the 
crucial difference between the Norwegian petroleum sector and those with which the 
Norwegians compete. In Norway the globalisation “rules of the game” come in the 








Another crucial element is the emphasis placed on energy security, tying the energy 
sector closely to important national interests. The focus on supply security can make 
deviances from the market economic route more acceptable. Internationally we have 
seen that the governments of states take an active role in energy policy. On recent 
example is the development of the Stockman field in northern Russia.  
 In this process, the government of France, and the government of Norway 
lobbied hard to get their companies (Total and StatoilHydro) to get a share in the 
development. Recently the government in Russia and Gatzprom announced that the 
shares in the development would be as follows: Total 25 percent, StatoilHydro 24 
percent, Gatzprom 51 percent (Dagsavisen 2007x; Dagsavisen 2007x; Klassekampen 
2007). 
 The price of oil is currently record high – and as the scarcity of petroleum 
supply increases while disturbances in the Middle East seem not to abate one might 
assume that the government role in energy will increase further. This create wiggle 
room for the national governments in the sense that the bandwagon effect of 
international politics makes the states follow the most effective strategy for ensuring 
security of supply.   
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6.0. Legal framework for using a National Oil Company  
If the political context create headaches for the people involved, the situation will 
surely become no better by glancing at the huge legal framework that surrounds the 
petroleum sector in general, and the added legal hullabaloo that engulfs the national 
participation. In the Norwegian law, the petroleum activities are closely regulated, as it 
also is through EU law and the WTO agreements. The role of the state in this market is 
also regulated by both Norwegian and European law. As the situation often is in 
politics, the legal framework both enables and constricts. In this chapter we shall begin 
at the outer shell of legalities, the EU and EEA laws, and then look at the Norwegian 
law. The laws and directives that stem from the EEA agreement are in a special 
position, as they are both national and international laws The rules from the EEA  
become a part of the Norwegian law, but are overseen by both the EFTA surveillance 
agency and the national courts.   
 
6.1. European law – the outer shell  
In May 1992, on Oporto, the EU countries and the EFTA countries signed the EEA 
treaty, including EFTA in the internal market in the EU.7 This treaty has had a 
profound effect on the Norwegian legal and political reality in the years to follow. The 
EEA treaty is a rather complicated piece of international law. On the one side, it 
represents an international regime regulating the economic behaviour in the member 
states. On the other side, the rules and regulations stemming from the EEA/EU travels 
directly into the Norwegian national law, after a brief hearing in the Storting. This 
makes it difficult to decide how to approach these laws. The EFTA side in the EEA is 
responsible for monitoring the manner of which the EFTA states comply with the 
regime of regulations surrounding the membership in the internal marked. Most 
crucially this applies to all rules and regulations concerning the free flow of 
commodities, services, people and capital.  
                                                 
7 Today EFTA consist of Norway, Iceland, Lichtenstein and Switzerland. Switzerland is not a 
part of the EEA agreement. 
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 According to Hans Peter Graver, the EFTA courts describe the EEA agreement 
as “an international treat sui generis which contains a distinct legal order of its own”, 
and that the EEA, while less comprehensive than the EU treaties, is an unusually 
extensive international treaty (Graver 2000: 7).  
 
The main task of the EFTA Surveillance Authority is to ensure that EEA 
rules are properly enacted and applied by the EFTA States. These rules 
include for example, the general principles for the free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital, covering fields such as foodstuffs, veterinary 
and physiosanitary matters, energy, intellectual property rights, the 
environment, mutual recognition of diplomas, social security, consumer 
protection, financial services and transport. Specific rules apply to trade in 
fish and in processed agricultural products. 
 
In general, the EFTA States are obliged to notify the Authority of their 
transposition of EEA provisions into national law. If a State does not 
transpose and apply the EEA rules correctly, the Authority will intervene. 
The Authority may eventually initiate infringement proceedings which, as a 
last step, may bring the matter before the EFTA Court (ESA 2007). 
  
The central tenet in the EEA agreement is the four freedoms, a concept that stems 
from the European Union. This means that the agreement is there to ensure the free 
movement of people, capital, commodities and services. Competition being the key 
word in the globalized world, the agreement also aims at “levelling the playing field” – 
removing any obstacles for free competition. This means new, legal difficulties for 





6.1.1. EEA law 
The four freedoms include the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons. 
In the following, we shall mainly focus on the free flow of capital and goods. Another 
crucial element of the EEA agreement is the intense focus on free markets – meaning 
that no trade hindering shall occur within the agreement. Before we proceed, we 
should however take a look the agreement itself. 
 EEA agreement membership means a “light” membership in the European 
Union. The EFTA members enjoy access to the EU internal market, while remaining 
able to shield some areas from full-blown competition, as well as retaining a higher 
level of sovereignty than a full membership would mean. This is largely because of the 
so-called veto right that lies in the agreement, in other words the ability the EFTA 
countries have to say no to the directives coming from the EU (Seiersted et al. 2004: 
21). In signing the agreement, the EFTA countries became an integral part of the 
internal market, committing them to following the rules and regulations laid out by the 
EU in these matters. To ensure the EFTA countries´ compliance with the agreement, 
the EFTA Surveillance Agency (ESA) was established. The ESA situated in 
Luxemburg, functions as the judge for the EFTA countries on matters relating to the 
agreement. For the EU side of the agreement, the European Courts serve the same 
purpose (Arnesen 1996; Ibid). 
 As one can imagine, the relationship between EFTA on the one hand, and the 
EU on the other was asymmetrical from the beginning. The original EFTA states that 
signed the agreement in 1992, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Iceland, Luxemburg, Austria 
and Switzerland were not the most powerful of states. Switzerland voted no to the 
agreement in a referendum already in 1992, and Austria, Sweden and Finland became 
members of the European Union only a year after the agreement was effective. This 
left Norway, Iceland and Luxemburg as the remaining part of the EFTA side 
(Seiersted et al. 2004: 32). 
 The EEA agreement has several facets that make it different from other 
comparable international regimes. With the agreement, the EFTA countries copied a 
lot of the EU competition and market law directly into the national law, as well as 
committing to include any updates and new legislation into the national laws. As 
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mentioned earlier, the agreement opens for a possible veto from the EFTA countries if 
the legislation should be unacceptable. Whether the veto could be used in real life is 
still an open question – in the 13 years the agreement has been in effect, the veto has 
never been used. Even though some of the directives from the EU have created 
significant turmoil in the domestic political debate, the veto has never been used 
(Claes and Fossum 2002: 7).8 
 If we look away from the question of whether or not Norway is to become a full 
member of the EU, there are mainly two diverging views of the agreement. Firstly, we 
have the view that the agreement is crucial for maintaining the current level of trade 
between Norway and the EU. On the other hand, we have the view that the agreement 
represents in essence an “emasculation of national sovereignty” (Claes and Fossum 
2002: 1) 
6.1.2. Free flow – competition, government aid and acquisitions 
Ensuring free movement of capital, persons, goods and services requires a lot of 
regulation. The same can be said about making one single European market. With 
regards to the role of the states in the domestic economic system, it has fostered a 
significant regulative effort from both ESA and the European Union. As noted, the 
EFTA Surveillance Agency can take the government before the EFTA courts if some 
element in government policy does not comply with the agreement. Many of the 
previous mechanisms used by the government to control the petroleum market have 
been criticized for being in violation with the agreement. As we shall se, a more direct 
approach to government ownership will probably place the government in a situation 
that is, if not in violation, then at least rather shady with regards to the agreement.   
 What then, happens if the government loses the case against ESA? The answer 
to that question is very much dependent on government interest, as we shall se in this 
example. 
 In a case that ESA launched itself, concerning the earmarking of certain post 
Doc positions at the University of Oslo for women; the government lost its case in the 
                                                 
8 In Norway the question as to whether or not to include various directives into domestic law 
have often created huge political debate. No government has ever proposed to use it 
(Seiersted et al. 2004). 
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EFTA courts. The Norwegian University law from 1995 contained among other things 
a paragraph stating that, as a gender equality measure, the University could earmark 
certain positions for the underrepresented sex. As the law stated  
hvis det ene kjønn er klart underrepresentert innen den aktuelle 
stillingskategorien på vedkommende fagområde, skal de som er av det 
underrepresenterte kjønn spesielt inviteres til å søke … Styret kan 
bestemme at en stilling kun skal utlyses for det underrepresenterte kjønn 
(Gammel universitetslov § 30). 
 
The last sentence, “The board can decide that a position should be 
earmarked for the underrepresented sex” created trouble with the non 
discrimination principle in the EEA agreement. 
 
In this case, the government lost the case. The last sentence was hence changed to a 
less categorical formulation. The verdict did not however have any consequences for 
the women who had gotten their jobs through this formulation. If the government were 
to intervene in StatoilHydro, the EFTA courts might say that the act was in violation 
of the EEA agreement – but if the process is quick, the verdict need not have any 
consequences for the outcome of the act.  
 
Free flow – competition rules  
In general, the free trade regime created by the EU’s internal market is huge. The parts 
covered by the EEA agreements also represent an enormous amount of rules and 
regulations – there to facilitate a very comprehensive free trade regime. The EEA rules 
and regulations covering the four freedoms can basically be described as a set of 
prohibition provisions, with appurtenant exceptions. This dualism can be found in 
most of the regulation basis for the four freedoms: First the rule specifies that forbids 
restrictions to the free movement, and then secondly a provision stipulating that 
restrictions may be allowed if this is justified more precisely in specific considerations 
(such as goods (art 28), establishment (art 31 and 33)). Further, the agreement also 
specifies any rights that might devolve to the citizens (Seiersted et al. 2004: 260ff). 
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 The provisions on harmonization are closely linked to the four freedoms, and 
also the very foundation of the agreement. The purpose of the EEA is to create a 
uniform market. This requires harmonization of the trade rules in the territories. The 
harmonization of trade rules in order to manage the internal market is the very core of 
the EEA, and it is against this backdrop the four freedoms must be viewed. In addition, 
article 3 of the agreement contains the “loyalty” principle. This principle implies that 
states have a duty to fulfill the intentions of the agreement in general. In principle, this 
means that the states shall abstain from doing anything contrary to the purpose of the 
agreement, and from a more positive angle make sure to take measures in order to 
comply with the agreements purpose (Arnesen 1996: 68 – 69; Ibid: 262).   
 
Non discriminatory regulations  
Discrimination can mean different things in different situations. In some situations, 
total equality means no discrimination, while in other cases a differential approach is 
the best way to eliminate discrimination. In all its simplicity, the non-discriminatory 
regulations mean that it is illegal to discriminate based on citizenship. This applies 
regardless of whether we are talking about an actual person or a legal person. In the 
case of legal persons, the non-discrimination regulation concerns discrimination on the 
grounds of what EU or EFTA country the entity is based. The rule is active if the 
entity is established in an EFTA/EU state (Seiersted et al. 2004: 260 – 378). 
The EU courts has stated that  
 
“The prohibition against discrimination … implies that uniform situations 
must not be treated different, and that different situations must not be 
treated uniformly, unless discrimination is objectively justified (EU courts 
1983, premises, part 23, my translation).” 
 
One way of exemplifying the non-discrimination rule is to look at the Phil Collins 
verdict (Seiersted et al. 2004: 265). In this case, the English recording artists Phil 
Collins and Cliff Richards had been subject to illegal bootlegging, meaning that there 
were unauthorized concert recordings being sold on the market. While the recording 
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had taken place in the US, the records were being sold in Germany. Germany, at the 
time had a law guarding recording artists against this sort of illegal enterprise. It did 
however only apply to artists from Germany. Phil Collins then brought a case for the 
EU courts, claiming that this was a breach of the EU non-discrimination rule. The 
Courts agreed with Collins in this, and subsequently the precedence is that any 
EU/EEA citizen is to be treated the same as a national citizen (Ibid: 265). 
 As mentioned above, the law applies for real persons and legal persons alike. 
This means that an energy corporation from an EU/EEA country shall enjoy the same 
legal rights, and protection from discrimination as Phil Collins, or any other person. In 
other words, the Norwegian government is prohibited from giving preferential 
treatment to companies from Norway, be they large oil companies or sub-contractors.  
 According to Arnesen (1996), there are several ways to demonstrate that 
uniformity does not exist, in the meaning that actors need to be treated alike. The 
likeness principle is relative, in the sense that like should be treated alike, and different 
should be treated different (Ibid: 90ff). This makes the principle of non-discrimination 
something that in many cases have to be decided on a case-by-case basis. How then 
can a government, or ESA for that matter, decide whether there has been a breach of 
this principle, or whether the government can successfully prove that there are 
objective and legitimate grounds for deviation?  
 The Courts states that “there cannot be discrimination, in the sense of the 
treaty’s art 40 (Treaty of Rome), if the difference in the treatment of actors reflects 
differences in the situations in which these actors find them selves in (Arnesen 1996: 
95).” 
  
Direct state support – a steeplechase for government activity  
According to the EEA treaty (art 61(1)), all subsidies “given by state funds in any 
form, that twist or threaten to twist competition by favoring specific businesses or the 
production of specific goods” is prohibited if the support influence the cooperation 
between the agreement parties (Seiersted et al. 2004: 582). 
 Subsidy can take the form of any financial aid that is presumed economically 
beneficial to the receiver, and is not limited to the transferal of funds from the state to 
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the entity receiving the subsidy. Article 61 of the EEA agreement also includes 
transfer of property, overpricing and aid through reduction of taxes and public charges 
specific for one enterprise. The range of public measures that can be found to fall into 
the category of state subsidy is rather astonishing.  
 
Even to postpone collection of a tax claim can be seen as government 
subsidy in the context of article 61. Also the act of converting a claim the 
public has towards a enterprise into equity deposit would amount to a state 
subsidy if the value of the claim and the value the deposit has in the 
business is in accordance (Seiersted 2004: 583).  
   
In these provisions lies a principle of return service. This means that the government 
can give support to private or public business if the government gets a return service of 
the same market value. All aid that the state gives can, accordingly, be compared to a 
marked based return service. Should the state give financial (or other) aid to a 
business, and receive a service at a smaller value than the aid, then the difference 
between the two will count as government subsidy and is not allowed under article 61 
(ibid). 
 In some cases, the state acts as an investor, similar to private investors. In this 
case this state channel support to the business through the stock market and as an 
investor in the company. For situations like this, the Commission has come up with the 
“market economic investor principle”.  
 
(WWTPID) What would the private investor do? 
The market economic investor principle states that the government, in its actions 
toward a company in which it owns shares, need to act according to market economic 
principles. In both private and public enterprise, the company gets financial resources 
form it shareholders. This could create problems in art 61 of the agreement, since aid 
from governments is not allowed. Naturally, there needed to be some sort of 
arrangement that enabled governments or government agencies to hold shares in 
companies. The solution to this apparent problem was the market economic principle. 
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In the principle, the Commission compares the state with a hypothetical private 
investor – in such a way that government aid to NOCs is allowed, as long as  the terms 
for the transfer of funds are not better than what had been the case had it been a private 
investor (ibid). 
 In it’s vademecum on rules for state aid, the Commission defines state aid as  
an aid that “should constitute an economic advantage that the undertaking would not 
have received in the normal course of business (EU Commission 2007)” The key 
element being “would not have received in the normal course of business”. Not 
surprisingly, the hypothetical private investor is a rational economic man, who does 
not place much value on market economical extra curricular items that may require 
making less money.   
 The use of the market economic investor intuitively asks for some immediate 
clarifications: What interests would the private investor value and pursue? And how 
does that relate to the interests of the public? The state’s interests are often more 
comprehensive than those of private investors, and the state interests cannot always be 
justified in economic terms, at least not in the short run.  
 If the state were to channel funds to a publicly owned company, the question 
becomes whether a private investor would have made the same judgment based on the 
same information, and in the same situation. If the private investor would invest the 
same amount in the company if he or she had the same share as the state, than the state 
actions are “market conform”. If, on the other hand, the private investor would judge 
the investment to be economically unsound, the decision is not market conform, and 
hence represents a breach of article 61 in the agreement (Seiersted et al. 2004: 580 – 
590).   
 A crucial element here is the difference between the dispositions of majority 
and minority shareholders. If one investor has a majority of the shares in a corporation, 
as the government has in Statoil, then the investor would tend to make decisions based 
on a longer timeframe. Regarding financial and market based returns for the 
investment, the longer timeframe might enable the investor, or the state to broaden the 
specter of interests sought through the ownership. If on the other hand the investor 
 66
only holds a minority of the shares, then the timeframe shrinks, and the focus shifts in 
the direction of short-term profits.   
 The market economic investment principle is a tool to analyze the decision to 
invest. This means that the timing is crucial. The principle does not require that profits 
are actually made. The purpose of the principle is to enable an analysis of how the 
decision was made. It is not against the law in Europe to have a bad business sense it is 
only strongly discouraged. Of course, this also applies for states. What the principle 
does is that it mandates the states to have a clear expectation of financial return service 
(Ibid). 
  
State aid through intermediaries 
Do the rules on state aid just apply to states, or does it also apply to state owned 
corporations and government agencies? Yes. While the article 61 only mentions states, 
several verdicts in both the EU courts and the EFTA court have stated that both 
municipalities and government agencies can give state aid. In Judgment by the Court, 
20 May 1999, the case of the government of Norway v. ESA gave an opinion as to who 
can give state aid, and what constitutes such aid. The case in question were one where 
the ESA had taken the Norwegian government to court over the so-called 
“differentiated employment fee” in Norway, where the inhabitants in more rural parts 
of Norway were subject to lower taxes than the rest of the country. In this case the 
Court found that regional support of this kind were not in compliance with article 61, 
citing that to be in compliance the benefit need to be made available generally. The 
court stated that 
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It is not in dispute that the differentiated contribution system at issue was 
designed to benefit certain regions. Although the advantageous contribution 
rates are formally open to all undertakings, the Court finds that the system 
does in fact confer direct competitive advantages on undertakings in the 
favoured regions compared to undertakings located elsewhere, due to the 
high correlation between the zone of location of an undertaking and the 
place of residence of its workforce (EFTA Court 1999: Premise 37). 
 
According to Seiersted (et al. 2004) it also follows from the case Germany v. the 
Commission (case 248/84) that municipalities and counties is included in article 61 
(Seiersted et al. 2004: 593). In ESA v. the Norwegian Government, the court also 
stated that the article covers government agencies and public companies.  
 
In referring to “any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or 
through State resources in any form whatsoever”, Article 61(1) EEA is 
directed at all aid financed from public resources (EFTA Court 1999: 
Premise 34). 
 
This implies that if StatoilHydro, a public limited corporation is covered by article 61, 
should they for instance choose to back a subcontractor with a loan priced below the 
market rates. This is however, true only to a certain extent – as with most of these 
rules, there are of course exemptions. If there is no “paper trail” from the government 
to the company giving instructions to give aid, than the company acts as a private 
entity and a separate legal person from the government. The Courts decisions in cases 
concerning this are somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, the courts have 
established a quite large definition of agencies that can give state aid. On the other 
hand, the EU Courts decided in the case of France v. the Commission (Stardust 
Marine) that the crucial element is the structural conjunction between the state and the 
agencies. In this case, the Court stated that one cannot blatantly assume that the state 
uses its influence at all times in companies where the state is the owner. It then 
becomes crucial to investigate whether the state had any implicitly in the decision to 
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grant the benefits in question. If the state did not exert influence then the government 
goes free, if the state did use its influence the state has violated article 61 (Seiersted et 
al. 2004: 596). 
 This implies that the Commission needs to investigate on a case by case basis 
whether the state had anything to do with a state owned corporations decision to help a 
third party. The rules on state aid do in this way hinder some government control.  
 
Acquisitions  
As with most of the rules in the EEA agreement, the rules regulating public 
acquisitions exist in order to facilitate free competition in the market. In most 
countries, the public is one of the biggest consumers, and biggest purchaser of various 
services. So if the government is making a big purchase, this can potentially twist the 
competition if the acquisition is not made in a correct, open and transparent way. For 
small and medium sized companies, getting a government contract could mean the 
difference between perishing and flourishing. Hence, the regulations are 
comprehensive.  
 The acquisitions rules in the EEA agreement are based on four pillars, the first 
of them being publicity. As one of the most basic criteria for a free and open 
competition is that all the relevant parties are aware of the competition, this pillar is 
relatively important. In addition to requiring that the acquisition is published in the 
European database TED, the directive here stipulate that the public is to inform the 
market about all planned acquisitions in the coming fiscal year. This is mainly so that 
the contractors have the time to plan ahead. Bids of this size are not thrown together in 
a heartbeat. Since the agreement also specify that the entire process, at least the 
announcement of the competition and the final result is public, the EEA places the 
responsibility for control, and in the final extent the appeal to the courts with the 
organizations and corporations competing in the contest. These actors have a vested 
interest in the outcome, and therefore are ideal for the purposes of monitoring the 
process (Seiersted et al. 2004: 627ff). 
 The other pillar is equal treatment. This follows directly from the main purpose 
of the EEA agreement, where equal treatment of all citizens and corporations in the 
 69
European economic area is crucial. In the context of government acquisitions, the 
concept of equal treatment means that all the bid competitions need to open to 
companies and persons from the entire area. This relates to the requirement of early 
notice when public bodies are to make an acquisition. It also makes it extremely hard 
for governments to favor local business, in order to realize some other, non-economic 
interest the government may have. To exemplify, when the government announce 
large-scale petroleum projects, like the Snow-white field in Norway, there are 
generally big hopes in the local municipality for a surge in local job opportunities. 
This is often the main reason the local authorities have for approving these large-scale 
installations in their back yard. Naturally, large-scale installations have a positive 
effect on the economy all together, and almost automatically create jobs in the service 
sector. However, should the government choose to earmark some of the construction 
work for local entrepreneurs, this would be in violation of this rule (ibid). 
 The two next pillars relate to each other enough to treat them as one. 
Transparency and control represent the two last of the pillars underpinning the rules of 
Government Acquisitions. As mentioned above, the main control mechanism is that 
with a transparent bid system, the applicants themselves will complain to the courts if 
there is some irregularity with the process (ibid). 
 Following the verdicts cited above, we can extrapolate that the rules that apply 
to government acquisitions, also apply for government agencies, such as national oil 
companies. In other words, the same rules that apply for public sector institutions 
apply for public corporations – hence Statoil is unable to favor local enterprise, or any 
other enterprise for that matter. This is a rule that apply to Statoil because it is a NOC, 
and accordingly do not apply to private companies.  
 The EEA agreement creates significant barriers to national participation in parts 
of public policy even loosely connected with the market. However, there are 
loopholes. And as we saw earlier, the world does not stop even if the EFTA court 
should say that a government initiative is in breach with the agreement.  
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6.2. Norwegian petroleum laws – the inner shell  
The Norwegian petroleum and shareholder laws regulate the inner shell of legislation 
in this case. 
 
No one but the state can engage in petroleum enterprise without the 
approvals and consents that are required according to this law. The 
regulations incidentally in this law, and the secondary law given in 
accordance with it, apply to such enterprise as far as they fit (LOV 1996-
11-29 nr 72, art 1-3, my translation). 
 
Most of the Norwegian petroleum law and policy as well, stem from this paragraph 
stating that it is the Norwegian government who runs the petroleum sector. As 
mentioned earlier, the approach to petroleum policy taken by the UK and Norway was 
a bit of revolution in the way states managed their resources. 
 The Norwegian legal framework around the petroleum sector consists of two 
laws. Firstly, the petroleum law, as already mentioned. Secondly, the petroleum tax 
law – a law with a rather self-explanatory name. In addition to these laws, there are 
several EU/EEA directives, notably directive 92/22/EF 30 May 1994 that regulate the 
conditions for hydrocarbon exploration. If we were to make a list of the most 
controversial directives, the next one would be close to the top: the gas market 
directive, or Directive 98/30EF, 22 June 1998 – Concerning rules for the internal 
market for natural gas. In fact, the current prime minister of Norway was Minister of 
trade and industry when this directive was negotiated. While negotiating the directive, 
the Norwegian government was ostensibly prepared for an annual loss of up to nine 
billion NOK as a consequence of the directive (DN 2001). 
 In addition to this, the concessionary systems consist of various legal 
documents, as well as standard contracts. Together these rules create the inner shell of 
laws and regulations.  
 The specific difference between the laws created in the UK and Norway and the 
other existing laws for petroleum enterprise was that the laws placed the power in the 
hands of the state. As we can see from article 1 of the petroleum law, the text clearly 
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states that no one but the state can make a decision to exploit the resources. This has 
meant that the state has made a substantial financial profit from the petroleum 
industry, as well as a historic guarantee that the state, through Statoil took part in the 
learning process on the Norwegian shelf.  
 Today, the situation is slightly different – meaning that the government cannot 
give StatoilHydro fields without an open contest, and the company is on its own 
concerning internal distribution of power in the operating group. However, the laws do 
create a special situation, since any company who operates on the Norwegian shelf 
does so with the expressed permission of the state, and as a legal agency of the state. 
Though the government aid regulation do not apply, some of the Norwegian laws 
regarding acquisitions and contracts do.  
 From the perspective of trying to comprehend the scope of the maneuvering 
room for politicians and bureaucrats, the legalities is closely tied with the change of 
institutional policy mentioned above. Do too internal political strife in Norway, and a 
willingness to follow international trends; the institutions surrounding Norwegian 
petroleum policy and legislation were changed continually through the 1980ies and 
90ies. The different phases I have described previously and hence will not spend time 
on now. The point in this context is that the legal framework has changed accordingly, 
from allowing for extensive political interference within the sector, to moving the 
politics from the market and into the company, and last, moving the politics from the 
company and into the General assembly of the company- which predictably led to a 
partial privatization of Statoil. 
 On the legal side, the main purpose of the petroleum laws now is to ensure that 








 7.0. Instrument out of tune? 
Tying together the theoretical framework from international relations, international 
political economy and some theories of domestic public sector reform, we find a line 
of globalization influence that we can use to illuminate the dark areas of this 
discussion. As Weiss (2003) points out, the forces of globalization may also leave 
some maneuvering room for states. This is not a zero-sum game. If the market 
acquires more power, it does not necessarily follow from this that the state is left 
powerless. For our analytical purposes, we cannot assume that the withdrawal of the 
state from the role as an active player is merely a consequence of this powerlessness. 
As we have seen in Norway, the government seems ready to reenter the market in a 
more active way than previously was the case.  
 Earlier we arrived at three theoretical expectations. These were; (i) the states 
role vis-à-vis the market and the NOC have changed as a consequence of both changes 
in domestic preferences and international pressure. This has led to institutional reform 
and changes in the mainstream political attitude towards using the NOC to attain 
national interests in the sector. (ii) The ability of the states  to control the NOC is 
constrained as a consequence of domestic institutional reform, and participation in 
rigid international regimes. And, (iii) the state may also be given an extended room to 
control the NOC as a consequence of interdependence, through the global political 
currents.   
 
7.1. State v. market - changing realities  
Garret and Lange tells us how external economic events shape the preferences of 
domestic actors, leading to policy change. In the Norwegian petroleum sector, we see 
this in the reform of the surrounding institutions and the 2001 reform of Statoil (Claes 
2003; Garret and Lange: 1996).  
 The changes in policy and the changes in the very role of the state have resulted 
in an asymmetry of resources between the company and the state – if we are to believe 
Strange (1999) and O’Brian (1992).  The institutional reform in the Norwegian 
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petroleum can be said to follow the same trend – change of institutional policy due to 
change in external realities. 
 The role of the Norwegian state in the petroleum industry has indeed changed 
from the times of the ten oil commandments. The approach, both in institutional policy 
and in the legal and political contexts have changed dramatically. During the 1980ies 
and throughout the 1990ies and early 2000 the trend was to downsize the states 
participation in the petroleum sector.  
 The institutional reforms that happened in these years followed a pattern of 
decreasing direct state control over the sector, and switching the focus over to more 
agent –principal, and representative ways to control the company. The theoretical 
expectation was to see a state-NOC relationship that had changed from the one we saw 
in the early years of petroleum industry  
 Theoretically, the states role in the market has diminished, from a participating 
entrepreneur to more of a regulating bystander. We have already seen the five roles the 
government might take in relation to the industry and the market. As Grønlie (1990b) 
tells us, the most common is to se these roles appear together, rather than a 
government choosing one and sticking to it. Historically we see that the Norwegian 
government has chosen a rather comprehensive approach.  
 The different mechanisms that the government can use covers a vide array of 
different policy instruments. In this analysis, we focus our attention on the mechanism 
of direct involvement in the market through ownership in a company. In this case, we 
focus on the petroleum market, and the NOC StatoilHydro.   
 Within the use of this one specific mechanism, the case of the Norwegian 
petroleum sector illustrates a billowing trend, from the hands off approach in the early 
1960ies, to the very strict hands on approach that defined the petroleum policy in the 
1980ies. Then in the 1990ies and 2000s, the government again let the business be 
business and retracted to control the market through the mechanisms of the other 
market-based mechanisms.   
 In the Soria Moria declaration, and in the various whitepapers discussed above 
the government presented a range of interests to be attained among other things 
through ownership. Attaining these interests would imply that the state took a rather 
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more socially reforming role than the case had been previously. Some of the 
government interests presented would also stipulate that the government move more 
into the entrepreneur role – a role that imply taking decisions that may not be 
economically sound in the short and medium run (Grønlie 1990b: 17). 
 If the state is able to intervene in the market in this way, then the theoretical 
approach of O’Brian and Strange might be premature – giving room for the more 
moderate approach presented by Weiss. It may however be a long way from today to 




The current Norwegian government writes in the whitepaper on ownership that they 
place the NOC ownership in the long-term industrial category – meaning that the 
objectives to be attained through StatoilHydro are not merely to make money. As 
Grønlie (2001) also pointed out, the objective of government ownership should be 
seen as something more than pure economics.  
 In the same whitepaper, the government outlined several focus areas where they 
stated that state ownership should be used to nudge the market in the right direction. 
As refereed above, the list is as follows. 
 
- Health, Environment and Security (HMS) 
- Research, Development and competence building  
- Environmental protection 
- Ethical business, Social responsibility 
- Gender equality 
- Anti-corruption 
- Security 
- Smooth relocations and reorganizing 
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In addition to these comes the self-evident interest that the state through the ownership 
shall make some financial gain over time. The goal for the government is to contribute 
through the ownership to the industrial long-term growth of the company. In this 
setting the government might really be trying, as Grønlie (2001) states it, to combine 
two incompatible goals – that is to combine making money with attaining government 
interests. Based on the Soria Moria declaration, and the programs of the parties in the 
current government, one may also add securing jobs in the rural parts of the country to 
this list.  
 The goal here is not to give an exhaustive list of interests, but merely to select 
six interest that illustrate best the subject at hand. For this purpose we will focus on 
environmental protection; anti-corruption; research, development and competence 
building; gender equality; security; and the interest of securing jobs in rural parts of 
the country.9 The interests can be sorted into the categories mentioned above – 
economic, political and regional, national and international (see table 2). 
 It would seem, intuitively, that the only one of these interests that would yield 
any short term financial gain for the government, or at least be compatible with what a 
private investor would choose to pursue, is research, development and competence 
building. That would be a natural investment for all, also for the private investor. As 
we remember from the chapter on StatoilHydro, this is one of the goals that have 
become crucial in the Norwegian petroleum sector – and as we shall see later, it might 
be hard to utilize the NOC to attain such a goal. We can place this interest in both in 
the national economic category, and in the national political category.  
 Anti corruption is another interest where the government and private investor’s 
interests are aligned – in the sense that no one would like to see the kind of bad PR 
that arises from a corruption scandal – as StatoilHydro has recently experienced. Not 
to mention that it is also illegal to engage in corruption in most states. Where the 
picture gets legally murkier is what happens when StatoilHydro, who has a stated goal 
                                                 
9 This is not an analysis of the prudence of the current government. And to try to deduce 
which of these interests the government might prioritize over the other is a task that lies well 
outside the scope of this text. For the sake of this study, we shall therefore select six 
governmental interests, and see whether the control mechanism of state ownership can be 
used to attain such an interest. 
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to be more active abroad, engages in markets where corruption sometimes is necessary 
to open the gates to the market. Assuring anti-corruption work fits in with the 
government’s national and international political interest, but also fits in with what we 
can call the company’s financial interest as well. 
 Gender equality is an important interest in Norway, and it is primarily a 
national political interest, and includes things like equal pay, affirmative action and a 
significant amount of either sex represented in the board of the company. 
Environmental protection on the other hand, is both a national, international and 
regional interest. As well as covering both the political and economic categories. This 
is mainly because of the sheer size of this category of interests. Environmental 
protection can relate to local emissions of toxins (in the air, rivers, lakes, fjords) or it 
can be on the scale of global warming – causing climate change for all the worlds 
citizens. The economic cost can also be local – in the form of cleanup costs from local 
emissions, or national. The national economic costs of environmental protection can 
also range from cleanup costs, to carbon emissions reductions. In the case of 
StatoilHydro, the company actually is exposed to the entire chain of this interest. From 
the local plants and platforms, to the global emissions of carbon gas, the company 
plays a role.  
 
Table 2 Classification of interest, Current government 
 Political Economic 
Regional Job opportunities in rural 
parts of the country 
Environmental protection 
Environmental protection 
Job opportunities in rural 
parts of the country 






Research, development and 
competence building 
Environmental protection  
International Anti-corruption 
Environmental protection 




According to classical international relations theory, the paramount interest of states is 
security. This is, according to theory, the one crucial national interest in the realpolitik 
that is international relations is the security of the nation. Security can of course be 
many things, and it has been many things over the years. For decades, the most serious 
security challenge in the west was the ever present danger of a large-scale nuclear war 
with the east. Likewise, the greatest fear in the east was a large nuclear war with the 
west. Over the years, the notion of security has changed and evolved. Today it is 
common to expand the term security to involve issues like natural disasters – one 
element that has been on the security agenda for a long time however, is energy 
security. Energy security implies both security of supply, and the security of the 
installations that enable the production of energy. As mentioned above, this makes the 
security of the Norwegian energy sector an interest not only for Norway, but also for 
our European neighbors. StatoilHydro is one of the largest exporters of natural gas in 
the world, and the third largest seller of crude oil. Security measures both in and 
around the company is both a national and international political interest - not to 
mention a crucial national economic interest.   
 In comparison to the seriousness of the security interest, one might consider 
securing jobs and job opportunities in rural parts of the country to be a minor interest. 
There is on the other hand no doubt that the representatives in the Norwegian 
parliament, and in the government, party conferences that come from the rural regions 
do not consider the issue to minor in any way. This makes it a regional political 
interest. The prospect of running the public sector in rural parts of the country without 
the revenue of income tax also makes it a significant regional economic interest in 
Norway. 
 
7.2.1. National Oil Companies as policy instruments 
As presented above the state can choose to use the NOC in different ways to attain 
these interests. The way proposed by the government as we saw earlier, is that the 
government (either the parliament of the government) sets out the general course, and 
then it is up to the board of the company to implement these goals into day-to-day 
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politics. This implies a representative agent – principal relationship between company 
and owner.  
 Within the management theory, that dominated much of the public sector 
reform from the 1980ies and well into the 21st century, this was one of the more 
central tenets. 
 There have been cases in the Norwegian political and economical domain 
where the company representatives have not acted on the governments long-term 
objectives. In these cases, the government approach to controlling the government 
would need to be a little more hands on. Still, once the term “hands on” has been 
mentioned, we need to take another look at the legal framework. 
 Previously, we outlined two shells of legal frameworks that surround 
government activity. As we saw these laws and regulations mean putting constraints 
on StatoilHydro that does not exist in the same way for the private companies. The 
European laws also place some constraints in the Norwegian petroleum sector and 
policy that is not present in the same way for Norway’s biggest competitor in the 
industry – Russia.  
 
7.2.2. Private investors and public institutions 
The market economic private investor is the true economic man. This is a person 
created by the Commission to evaluate the actions of states. The basic tenet of the 
market economic private investor is that he/she acts in accordance with market 
economical principles – and that he/she acts on the belief that no investment is prudent 
unless the investor receives some sort of financial return service. As discussed in 
greater detail above, the difference between the return service, and the initial 
investment counts as state aid, and is not permitted under art 61 of the EEA agreement.  
 In the whitepaper on ownership, the government proposes to organize the 
ownership in a representative way, where the company “understands” its role as the 
body implementing the government’s broader objectives. To clarify what will be an 
accepted way to go about this according to the EEA agreement, we can divide the 
interests in two – looking at what would require financial measures, and what interests 
would only require a change in the organization of the company.  
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 Some of the interests that we have mentioned could be seen as scales. For 
instance gender equality can be sought in different ways. One way of seeking gender 
equality is to stimulate women (or men) to be project leaders and to encourage leaders 
to promote the underrepresented sex when possible. One could also picture a more 
drastic approach, of for instance affirmative action of earmarking of positions. 
Referring to the example above, where the University of Oslo tried to earmark certain 
post Doc positions for the underrepresented sex, in this case women, we see that a 
approach of this kind is not compatible with the non discrimination clause. And 
legally, the NOC is a representative of the state if seeking gender equality is a goal it 
seeks on behalf of the state.  
 Research and development is a goal that can be said to give a financial return 
service. Since it is commonly accepted, also in among the private investors that in a 
competence intensive business like the petroleum industry one needs research, 
development and competence building to stay in the game. However, as we saw in the 
government’s proposition to merge Statoil and Norsk Hydro's petroleum division, 
there is a concern in the government that some of the research communities connected 
to the industry might become superfluous when the two companies merged. In 
addition, there is a clear government interest to further the development of these 
communities (see chapter x).  
 If the company acts as a representative of the state, the company has to adhere 
to strict rules of conduct. In essence, the rules that create the most trouble for state 
enterprise is the non-discrimination principle and the state aid rules. From the case 
ESA v. the Norwegian government (EFTA court 1999), we see that the state aid rules 
apply to any form of government aid, and that all use of state resources, in “any form 
whatsoever” counts as aid (Ibid: premise 34).  
 As we saw from the case of France v. the Commission, the company will be 
treated as a normal private company, as long as there are no elements linking the state 
to the decision. So, if StatoilHydro on its own chooses to back some of the superfluous 
research communities, this is completely all right. But, when the government has 
stated that this is a government interest, the picture becomes murkier.  
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 We already know from our discussion of the EEA agreement that favoring a 
specific region is out of the question when it comes to distributing jobs. The EFTA 
court verdict on the Norwegian differentiated employer fee states that it is not allowed 
under the non-discrimination clause to give special benefits to limited geographic 
areas. This is a competition-twisting move. Hence, if StatoilHydro has a need for 
carpenters in Hammerfest, on contracts of a certain size, then there needs to be a 
Europe wide competition for the bid.  
 As many of the other interests, environmental protection can be sought through 
creating stronger laws. Nevertheless, if the government were to grant StatoilHydro 
funds to operate in accordance with stricter environmental standards than is legally 
necessary, this would constitute an illegal competition twisting interference with the 
market, unless the government could expect a financial return service.  
 Anti corruption is an interesting interest, since StatoilHydro is currently 
recovering from a corruption scandal. It is not many years since Statoil was involved 
with a similar case in Iran. Legally, there is no trouble with the government instructing 
StatoilHydro not to break the law.  
 Ensuring security is an interest that can be sought through ownership; it can 
also be sought through the defense sector, and through other government mechanisms. 
Security is paramount, and security measures are not covered by the EEA agreement.  
 As we have seen from the discussion on the legal framework, the EEA 
agreement places significant strain on the government’s ability to use the mechanism 
of direct control in the company. This is also pointed out by Seiersted et al. (2004), as 
one of the consequences of the strict government aid rules and the non-discrimination 
principle in the agreement (ibid: 596). The fact that the governments approach to its 
ownership in StatoilHydro is explicitly long term and industrial. The government 
would be allowed to bend the principle of the market economic investor, since the 
expected financial return service could theoretically be seen only on a long-term basis.  
 The government also pointed this out in there whitepaper on ownership, that the 
EEA agreement places constraints the government’s ability to directly control the 
company. The Stardust Marine case and the peculiarities of the EEA agreement do 
however leave the government with some room to move.  
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 The EFTA courts have as we have seen above, only power to say “that was 
wrong”, meaning that they can only state that a historic event or ongoing process is 
wrong. And, the courts decisions have no effect on events that are completely finished 
The women that got their post Doc positions at the University of Oslo did not loose 
their jobs because the EFTA courts said that the decision to earmark the positions were 
illegal.  
 In pushing the limits of the agreement, the government can create more room 
for movement than exist today, if this is politically desirable.  
 
7.3. Room to move? 
As Weiss (2003) points out, the forces of globalization also leave some manoeuvring 
room for states. This is not a zero-sum game. If the market acquires more power, it 
does not necessarily follow from this that the state is left powerless. For our analytical 
purposes, we cannot assume that the states withdrawal from the role as an active 
player is merely a consequence of this powerlessness. 
 In a controlled environment, the government can use the NOC as a tool by 
reentering the old paragraph 10 – that meant taking all cases that had a political side to 
the General Meeting. Another way of governing would be the one the government has 
chosen today, that is to divide the responsibilities between the company and the state 
in such a way that the government decides the general goals, and the company 
implements the goals in the day-to-day business. This does however require a level of 
trust and a representative relationship between the government and the boards of the 
state owned companies. Marit Arnstad, his deputy, has replaced Eivind Reiten, the 
original director of the board of StatoilHydro. Arnstad has a long political career 
behind her, she has been a minister in the previous government where the Centre Party 
was involved, and more interestingly for us, and she was one of the writers of the 
Soria Moria declaration. Together with the leader of the centre party, Åslaug Haga, 
who today is minister of oil and energy in the Norwegian government, she negotiated 
the document laying out the government interests for the current election period.  
 There is no doubt that the relationship between Haga and Arnstad will be of a 
rather different character than the relationship between their predecessors. As far as 
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government control goes, the option of exercising control through an agent – principal 
relationship might seem like a rather efficient way of organizing things today.  
 There are, as we have seen, many constricting factor on what the government 
can do with the NOC. The EEA agreement places a lot of strain of the governments 
potential use of mechanisms in this context, as does the previous policy and 
institutional change in the Norwegian domestic scene.  
 There are no legal or political restrictions prohibiting the government for asking 
the NOC to take measures within areas that does not interfere with the competition of 
the company of any of its subcontractors. In this area, the government does indeed 
have some room to move. The general interests such as environmental protection, 
gender equality and anti-corruption lie within areas that is not cost intensive, and 
complying with them is completely possible to combine with a healthy company and a 
healthy competition. The same is true for security – the state can instruct StatoilHydro 
to comply with stricter security standards, but that will not alter the competition. The 
problem comes when the state has to enter the arena with money, or when the 
company has to enter the market to do things on behalf of the state. 
 For interests like competence and R&D and for securing jobs in the rural parts 
of Norway the picture is murkier.  
 Research, development and competence building is of course a central interest 
for both the government and the company. The problem in this case is the sub-
contractors in the knowledge area. The change from two to one large oil company in 
Norway has a profound impact on the knowledge sector in Norway. The country is not 
the largest in the world, in fact far from it – both in terms of how many people actually 
live in Norway, and in terms of the size of the knowledge sector compared to the 
industry. I you change the market from two big to one bigger; this makes the world a 
lot more difficult for the independent research communities. It is a central national 
interest to further the existence of these communities. Can the government ask the 
company to continue using services it do not need? Referring to the case of France v. 
the commission, we see that StatoilHydro can do this on its own, but not if the 
government has had anything to do with it. If the government has told StatoilHydro to 
do this, then the act of the company continuing to use these services, or possibly 
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giving a loan to them – or any other act the company takes to keep these people 
floating would constitute state aid, and a breach of article 61 of the EEA treaty.  
 We already know that favoring employees from one specific part of the country 
is a breach of the principle of non-discrimination. But this interest leads us to 
discussing the possible moves the Norwegian government can take, should it decide to 
try anyway. As we now gather to secure such interests by ownership could present 
some legal problems. In table 3 the interests that will be hardest, legally, are 
highlighted.  
  
 Political Economic 
Regional Job opportunities in rural 
parts of the country 
Environmental protection 
Environmental protection 
Job opportunities in rural 
parts of the country 






Research, development and 
competence building 
Environmental protection  
International Anti-corruption 
Environmental protection 
Research, development and 
competence building 
 
Table 3 Classification of Interests, feasibility 
As mentioned above, the EEA treaty is the third rail of Norwegian politics. The true 
fans of the treaty are few, but the near consensus is that the treaty is good for now. 
This is mostly a political reality. The fact is that no prospective majority government 
exist, that would consist solely of parties either willing to quit the EEA agreement, or 
apply for membership in the EU – meaning that the EEA agreement is a standing 
compromise between the two sides in the Norwegian EU debate.  
 Since the EFTA court only states that a violation has happened, after the act is 
over. There is a possibility for the government to use swift processes in these cases. 
For instance, when the contract is already given to a local entrepreneur, the EFTA 
courts cannot make any changes to the contract. According to Arnesen (2007 [Personal 
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Correspondence]) there is some trouble with this though. Because the Norwegian 
government is so dependent on the EEA agreement, the government actually has less 
room to maneuver than would be the case in this specific are were the country a 
member of the EU. 
 Given the rules on state aid, the best form of governing the state owned 
companies would be to govern trough an understanding of an agent – principal 
arrangement. The crucial point here being the understanding. If only the government 
believes that this is the way things work, the whole point disappears. If the 
government through the General Meeting has to instruct the board on how to do 
things, the article 61 becomes a problem. As long as there is a understanding between 
the board and the government that the board implements and the government points 
the way, then legally there should be few problems. This would require an active role 
of the government during selection of the board members.  
 
8.0. Conclusions 
The research question in this analysis was: To what extent can the Norwegian 
government utilize the StatoilHydro as a policy instrument, and under which 
conditions could this happen? The energy sector and especially the hydrocarbon 
industry is one of the most interest based policy sectors, in both domestic and 
international affairs. Controlling a country’s energy supply is a crucial security 
interest, and without stable energy prices and supply the state has small chances of 
generating or maintaining economic growth. This makes the energy market an ideal 
place to look when we are trying to find out what globalisation does to the states 
power, and the state-market relationship. The analysis presented here is a case study of 
the Norwegian petroleum sector, used to illustrate the general relationship between the 
state and the national oil company – to find out whether the state can use the national 
oil company as a policy instrument.  
 The theoretical framework for this analysis consists of a combination of 
international political economy and international relations. To explain the changes in 
the applied institutional policy in Norway, the analysis relies on the theoretical 
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contribution of Garret and Lange (1996) and the understandings presented in the 
scholarly study of new public management reforms.  
 Globalisation, and what consequence it has for the human society is one of the 
defining discussions of our time (Yergin 1998), yet economic globalisation is often 
discussed as an abstract phenomenon in international political economy. This case 
study analysis has focused on how the Norwegian government can use its NOC as a 
policy instrument.   
  
8.1. To what extent can the Norwegian Government use 
StatoilHydro as a policy instrument? 
We find in this analysis that the government is indeed constrained as a consequence of 
economic interdependence. As the government states it self in the ownership 
whitepaper: “the Norwegian membership in the EEA means that the ownership in 
Statoil cannot be used for political purposes, even though one could wish the 
opposite” (OED 2001).  
 The conclusion of the government might however be somewhat premature. The 
rules and regulations that stem from the European Union and the EEA agreement do in 
fact constrain the government in many ways. In our analysis, we have taken some of 
the government interests that are laid out in various party platforms, the governments 
Soria Moria Declaration and the whitepaper on ownership. While the EEA agreement 
does constrain some efforts the government would take, it does not rule out the use of 
StatoilHydro as a policy instrument.  
 There are different kinds of interests that can be attained by the use of the NOC. 
Using the NOC to assure interests such as health, environment and safety on the 
workplace, promoting gender equality and ensuring that the company itself does not 
engage in corruption is not prohibited under the EEA agreement. In such a way the 
government can use the NOC to attain some of its goals.   
 If the government should want to utilize the NOC to attain other interests, 
specifically interests that cost money, or interfere with the other companies on the 
market the question gets legally murkier. We have found that the EEA agreements 
rules and regulations regarding acquisitions, discrimination and state aid cover the 
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NOC as well as the state whenever the NOC can be seen as acting on the 
government’s orders. The legal verdicts discussed in chapter six do on the other hand 
suggest that there might be a way, if it is politically viable. 
 In the government whitepaper on ownership, the government describes using 
the state ownership in an agent-principal way. This is also consistent with the change 
in institutional policy in the petroleum sector under the last four governments in 
Norway. The petroleum sector is special, in the way that the government’s room to 
maneuver is both constrained and enabled as a cause of globalization and 
interdependence. The discussion of the legal side of the EEA agreement revealed that 
the state and StatoilHydro might be brought before the EFTA courts for trying to 
control the market through the ownership, but the findings also suggest that there are 
two elements of the EEA agreement that facilitate the use of ownership as an 
instrument.  
 The first point is that, should StatoilHydro for instance choose to back a 
subcontractor that is going through some straitened circumstances; this would generate 
speculation as to whether the state was involved. But if the state did not instruct the 
company to do it, then the state, at least as previous cases suggest, cannot be accused 
of meddling with the market. If the agent-principal relationship between the 
government and the NOC was truly representative, then the government could have 
significantly more room to maneuver.  
 Further more, the principle of the market economic investor do in fact allow for 
some wiggling room. The state has shown, through political decisions that the share 
holding in StatoilHydro is of a long-term industrial type. Neither in the EEA 
agreement, nor in the EU treaties, is having a bad sense of business illegal. If the 
government can provide sufficient evidence that its investments and moves are in the 
long term financial interest of the company, and that the return financial services for 
the government in the long run will mach the governments investment, then the legal 
side is still open.  
 The second point opening up room in the EEA agreement is more politically 
potent. The EFTA courts have only a demonstrating power – in the meaning that the 
courts will state in hindsight whether a decision was in breach with the agreement. 
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This makes it a theoretical possibility to assert influence in a succession of single 
issues, without a prospective verdict in the EFTA courts having any say over the actual 
real-life outcome of the process.  
 One of the problems with this approach is that such an event would place 
severe strain on the EEA agreement itself – an agreement that there is not much 
political support for placing such a strain on, as the agreement by many is said to be 
one of the reasons that Norwegian export business is prospering at all.  
 The government can actually use the NOC as a policy instrument within these 
narrow frames. Although pushing the limits of the EEA agreement is currently not a 
viable option politically speaking. Using StatoilHydro as a policy instrument in the 
long run is doable in the legal sense – but the room available to the government is 
drastically reduced compared to what it was 20 years ago. As we have seen, this is due 
both to a change in institutional policy and to the constraints from globalization.  
 
8.2. Under what circumstances can such a use occur? 
Using StatoilHydro as a policy instrument is not an easy task for any government. 
Broadly speaking, there are two sets of circumstances that influence the use of the 
NOC – the political and the legal contexts. In the short and medium term, the legal 
circumstances are set. Hence, the variable circumstance is the political one.  
 The current political context is in some ways conducive to using the NOC, and 
in some ways constraining. First, we find that the Norwegian political perception of 
the inherent value in the EEA agreement constrains the use of StatoilHydro. On the 
other hand, the political preferences that led the current government to win last 
election might signal a will to pay a political price in order to control the market and 
StatoilHydro.  
 The political preferences in the international arena could give the government 
room to move; in the sense that the change from market based reforms in oil exporting 
countries to more hands on approaches gives the government at precedence to follow. 
As noted earlier, the oil and gas importing countries might not like the development – 
but the increasing focus on energy security do allow for more hands on approaches in 
the energy sector. Deviating from the market-based approaches is more acceptable in 
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times of stress and security concern – in the global energy market now, the focus has 
shifted slightly from focusing on the market to focusing more on the actual supply of 
energy.  
 The announcement that StatoilHydro will join the Russian national oil company 
Gatzprom in developing the massive Stockman field also signals that international 
cooperation between nations and their NOCs is a viable solution in the current energy 
and security political climate.   
  
8.3. The state of the state 
Case studies do not generate a coherent data stream that is easy to generalize by it self, 
but by using theory and making sure the empirical data is gathered from as reliable 
sources as possible one can use the approach to say something about the bigger 
picture.  
 As mentioned, the Norwegian case is a interesting case since the impact of 
economic globalization in Norway do not come only as political pressure and 
international trade deals, it also come as legally binding rules and regulations from the 
EEA agreement. This, I argue, make Norway a micro cosmos of the impact of 
globalization.  
 The theoretical expectations presented earlier in the text did resonate in the 
empirical findings. We found that the relationship between the state and the market 
has changed dramatically the last 20 years, and that a substantial amount of this 
change is due to international economic interdependence. In this way we find support 
for the proponents of the idea that the state in 2007 indeed is smaller than its 
predecessors. However, we also found that the state is not completely powerless. The 
impact of globalization is mediated through the actual and normative composition of 
the domestic institutions. The idea of the totally powerless state seems, based on this 
analysis to be a myth.  
 Since the other countries where extensive use of NOCs is an option are 
members of neither the EU nor the EEA agreement – using the NOC as a policy 
instrument in those states would not be nearly as hard as in Norway. This puts further 
strain on the idea that the state is powerless.  
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